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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The received wisdom is that a federal court must ensure that it 
has subject matter jurisdiction before it may “proceed at all in any 
cause.”1  Such a stark vision of jurisdiction never has been literally 
true.2  But in recent years the Supreme Court has pushed the 
envelope and endorsed a potentially sweeping doctrine of 
jurisdictional sequencing—the decision of certain issues, and even 
the dismissal of cases, before a federal court has verified that it 
has subject matter jurisdiction.3 
Jurisdictional sequencing taps into fundamental questions 
about the nature and role of subject matter jurisdiction and what, 
if anything, a court may do before it has established jurisdiction.  
Because the Supreme Court has not rooted the doctrine in a clear 
theory, jurisdictional sequencing has engendered confusion among 
judges and scholars, who have been at a loss to explain it.  
Although a number of courts have embraced the leeway that the 
doctrine offers4—the ability to dismiss a case on easier grounds 
before taking up harder jurisdictional questions—most scholars 
have criticized it as illegitimate or incoherent.5  This Article is the 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) [hereinafter Steel Co.] 
(quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869)); see Scott C. Idleman, The 
Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 32 
(2001) (describing subject matter jurisdiction as a “limitation on a court’s power to act at 
all”). 
 2 See infra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
 3 The first scholar to discuss the idea at length dubbed the practice “jurisdictional 
resequencing.”  See Idleman, supra note 1, at 3.  Other scholars and commentators similarly 
have adopted that nomenclature.  E.g., Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1439, 1455–56 (2011); Joshua Schwartz, Note, Limiting Steel Co.: Recapturing a 
Broader “Arising Under” Jurisdictional Question, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2275–76 (2004).  
To my mind, describing the doctrine as “jurisdictional resequencing” assumes that subject 
matter jurisdiction always has enjoyed absolute priority when, in fact, it has not.  
Therefore, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s language, I refer to the doctrine as 
“jurisdictional sequencing.”  See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) 
[hereinafter Ruhrgas] (noting that the Court’s case law “does not dictate a sequencing of 
jurisdictional issues”). 
 4 See infra Part II.B (discussing lower courts’ use of flexible sequencing). 
 5 See, e.g., Idleman, supra note 1, at 4 (calling the doctrine “substantially illegitimate”); 
David L. Shapiro, Justice Ginsburg’s First Decade: Some Thoughts About Her Contributions 
in the Fields of Procedure and Jurisdiction, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 30 (2004) (criticizing 
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first to offer a theory that both explains the case law and grounds 
jurisdictional sequencing in a novel vision of subject matter 
jurisdiction’s precise role.  Specifically, I develop a theory of 
jurisdiction as a surprisingly narrow structural limitation on 
courts’ power to declare substantive law.  According to this view, 
subject matter jurisdiction protects only institutional values, 
including separation of powers and federalism, but not personal 
liberty interests. 
Scholars have begun to explore the consequences of sequencing 
rules generally and have demonstrated that such rules are more 
than an order of operations that leads inexorably to a particular 
result.6  Instead, sequencing rules can affect the outcome of cases 
and the development of both procedural and substantive law.7  
Jurisdictional sequencing most acutely affects judicial economy, 
allowing district courts to resolve cases more expeditiously and 
appellate courts to avoid costly remands on jurisdictional 
questions that have no bearing on a case’s outcome.8 
Any theory of jurisdictional sequencing ultimately must turn on 
the nature of subject matter jurisdiction—what specifically does it 
protect and what exactly is a federal court prohibited from doing in 
its absence?  Answering those questions is the only way to develop 
a robust theoretical understanding of jurisdictional sequencing.  
Although the doctrine has received more scholarly attention of 
late,9 the literature has failed to articulate a theory that both 
                                                                                                                   
Ruhrgas); Suzanna Sherry, Logic Without Experience: The Problem of Federal Appellate 
Courts, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 97, 127–29 (2006) (examining the tension in the Court’s 
jurisdictional-sequencing cases); see also Jack H. Friedenthal, The Crack in the Steel Case, 
68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 258, 259 (2000) (arguing that Ruhrgas departed from the traditional 
view of subject matter jurisdiction); Scott C. Idleman, The Demise of Hypothetical 
Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 52 VAND. L. REV. 235, 317–32 (1999) (anticipating and 
criticizing certain grounds on which courts might limit the holding of Steel Co.). 
 6 E.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for Judicial Decisionmaking: 
Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion, 63 FLA. L. REV. 301, 301 
(2011); Peter B. Rutledge, Decisional Sequencing, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2010). 
 7 Rutledge, supra note 6, at 7, 20–24. 
 8 Idleman, supra note 5, at 252–53; Joan Steinman, After Steel Co.: “Hypothetical 
Jurisdiction” in the Federal Appellate Courts, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 855, 910–11 (2001).  
 9 See supra notes 5–6; see also Heather Elliott, Jurisdictional Resequencing and 
Restraint, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 725, 737–46 (2009); Michael J. Edney, Comment, Preclusive 
Abstention: Issue Preclusion and Jurisdictional Dismissals After Ruhrgas, 68 U. CHI. L. 
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explains the jurisprudence and offers a coherent normative 
justification for jurisdictional sequencing. 
Most approaches have focused only on the low-level question of 
how to understand the jurisdictional sequencing cases and discern 
a rule that can guide lower courts in applying the doctrine.  As 
most scholars candidly admit, the results are internally 
inconsistent or fail to explain the case law fully.  The biggest 
problem, though, is that the most important antecedent question 
remains largely unaddressed—what is subject matter jurisdiction’s 
precise role?  The theory of jurisdictional sequencing that I develop 
fully resolves the low-level problem of explaining the case law.  
But it goes further, advancing a vision of subject matter 
jurisdiction’s unique importance in protecting the power of states 
and the political branches to create substantive law. 
Part II offers a brief overview of what I call the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdictional-sequencing trilogy.  The first case in the 
trilogy appeared to announce a virtually ironclad rule: a federal 
court must decide whether it has subject matter jurisdiction before 
it takes up any other issue.10  But the second and third cases 
pulled back from that absolutism, authorizing the dismissal of 
cases on any “non-merits threshold” ground at the outset.11  I then 
demonstrate the confusion that those cases have wreaked in the 
lower courts and the necessity of a theory to help courts discern 
which issues may (and may not) precede a determination of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
In Part III, I create a taxonomy of the jurisdictional-sequencing 
theories that scholars and courts have advanced.  I demonstrate 
that none of the theories can explain the case law or offer a 
satisfying normative explanation of subject matter jurisdiction’s 
precise role. 
In Part IV, I develop a theory of jurisdictional sequencing based 
on the dichotomy between conduct rules and allocative rules.  
Conduct rules govern primary obligations, rights, and prohibitions.  
                                                                                                                   
REV. 193, 214–16 (2001). 
 10 Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, 98, 101–02 (1998). 
 11 Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432–33 (2007) 
[hereinafter Sinochem]; accord Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 574, 584–85 (1999). 
1104 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 47:1099 
 
 
They usually are rules of decision—the elements of a cause of 
action and defenses that respond directly to those elements.  From 
a conceptual perspective, conduct rules typically affect how people 
understand rights and obligations ex ante and thus influence how 
people plan their lives.  By contrast, allocative rules govern access 
to courts, regulate procedural and administrative matters, and 
thus do not create conduct rules.  They govern two essential 
litigation questions: who decides, and how?  The first question—
who decides—encompasses rules that allocate decision-making 
authority among particular institutions and individuals.  Those 
rules often are jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional.  The second 
question that allocative rules answer—how to decide an issue—
usually involves administrative or procedural rules that pertain to 
the ways that decisionmakers interpret and apply conduct rules.  
Although the distinction bears similarities to the substance–
procedure dichotomy, I locate the dividing line in a slightly 
different place.  Moreover, in the criminal law literature, Meir 
Dan–Cohen has explored similar concepts that are especially 
salient to my analysis.12 
Part IV makes two methodological moves.  First, based on a 
close reading of the jurisdictional-sequencing trilogy, it identifies a 
principle—the dichotomy between conduct rules and allocative 
rules—that explains and reconciles the jurisprudence.  Courts may 
dismiss a case based on an allocative rule even before they resolve 
subject matter jurisdiction.  On the other hand, a court may not 
interpret, announce, or apply a conduct rule until it has verified 
jurisdiction. 
The second move engages the conceptual and normative 
questions surrounding the difference between conduct rules and 
allocative rules.  I argue that the dichotomy actually is grounded 
in a coherent vision of subject matter jurisdiction and is the best 
way to conceptualize jurisdictional sequencing. 
                                                                                                                   
 12 See generally Meir Dan–Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic 
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984) (exploring the difference between 
“conduct rules” aimed at the general public and “decision rules” aimed at officials who 
enforce conduct rules). 
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Subject matter jurisdiction is not principally concerned with a 
federal court’s ability to affect the parties before it but rather the 
power to craft conduct rules that, from an ex ante perspective, 
likely will affect individuals’ future conduct.  It is a narrow 
structural constraint—rather than a personal privilege—that 
protects federalism and separation of powers concerns.  
Consequently, subject matter jurisdiction prohibits federal courts 
only from trenching on the preeminent power of the federal and 
state governments—the authority to craft conduct rules. 
When a court adjudicates a conduct rule, it creates law at the 
margins by clarifying and giving greater content to that rule.  
Because shaping conduct rules takes a court, however 
tangentially, into the preserve of the states and political branches, 
a court must ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction before it 
weighs in on such rules.  On the other hand, the dismissal of a 
case based on an allocative rule carries no such risk.  Precisely 
because such dismissals do not implicate relevant federalism or 
separation of powers concerns, they do not necessarily require 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
The vision of subject matter jurisdiction that I develop here, 
though unorthodox, has purchase beyond the sequencing context.  
It dovetails with scholarly and doctrinal developments in other 
areas of the law.  Furthermore, it offers a systematic way to 
account for the nuanced interplay of jurisdictional, threshold, and 
merits questions that courts and scholars recently have begun to 
explore. 
II.  JURISDICTIONAL SEQUENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
This Part briefly outlines the jurisdictional-sequencing trilogy 
in which the Supreme Court at first appeared to embrace the 
absolute priority of subject matter jurisdiction but then laid the 
groundwork for a much more expansive doctrine of jurisdictional 
sequencing.  It then explores the confusion that has characterized 
lower courts’ attempts to apply those precedents and the need for a 
coherent theory to explain the parameters of jurisdictional 
sequencing. 
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A.  THE JURISDICTIONAL SEQUENCING TRILOGY 
1.  Steel Co.  In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 
the first case in the jurisdictional-sequencing trilogy, the Supreme 
Court seemed poised to determine the circumstances under which 
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 
1986 conferred a private right of action.13  Six Justices concluded 
that regardless of what the statute allowed, the plaintiffs lacked 
standing, an element of subject matter jurisdiction, to bring their 
lawsuit.14  Three Justices believed that they did not need to reach 
the standing question and would have held that the statute itself 
did not authorize the lawsuit.15  The case thus teed up the 
sequencing question of whether a court could resolve the statutory 
interpretation issue before a potential jurisdictional problem. 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, concluded that subject 
matter jurisdiction was paramount and assailed what he regarded 
as Justice Stevens’s indulgence in “hypothetical jurisdiction,”16 a 
doctrine that every circuit court of appeals had adopted in at least 
some fashion.17  Hypothetical jurisdiction had allowed a court, 
confronted with a difficult question of subject matter jurisdiction, 
to assume jurisdiction and dismiss a case on an easy merits 
ground, provided that the same party would have prevailed if the 
court had dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.18  In other 
words, it allowed a court to select the easiest route to the same 
destination. 
Notwithstanding the allure and ubiquity of hypothetical 
jurisdiction, the Court held that it could not “endorse such an 
approach because it carries the courts beyond the bounds of 
authorized judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles 
                                                                                                                   
 13 See 523 U.S. at 86; see also id. at 112 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 14 See id. at 109–10 (majority opinion); id. at 110 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 111 
(Breyer, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). 
 15 See id. at 131–34 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 134 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 16 See id. at 93–94 (majority opinion). 
 17 Idleman, supra note 5, at 237. 
 18 See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 93–94.  
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of separation of powers.”19  Citing venerable case law, the Court 
then announced a seemingly absolute rule that a federal court 
must establish the propriety of subject matter jurisdiction before it 
takes up any other issue: 
“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in 
any cause.  Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, 
and when it ceases to exist, the only function 
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact 
and dismissing the cause.” . . .  The requirement that 
jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter 
“spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial 
power of the United States” and is “inflexible and 
without exception.”20 
Notwithstanding concerns that those observations were not part of 
the majority’s holding,21 lower courts overwhelmingly treated the 
prohibition against hypothetical jurisdiction as binding22 (or, at 
the very least, as well-considered dicta23). 
2.  Ruhrgas.  Just one year after Steel Co., the Supreme Court 
decided the second case in the jurisdictional-sequencing trilogy, 
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,24 in which the Court retreated 
from (or at least strongly qualified) the language in Steel Co. that 
                                                                                                                   
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 94–95 (second alteration in original) (quoting, respectively, Ex parte McCardle, 
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868), and Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 
111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). 
 21 See id. at 109–10; id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see also 
Friedenthal, supra note 5, at 262; Steinman, supra note 8, at 933. 
 22 See, e.g., United States v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 287 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting 
that the Supreme Court “recently, and flatly, rejected” hypothetical jurisdiction); Seaborn v. 
Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 143 F.3d 1405, 1407 n.2 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that the “Supreme 
Court squarely rejected the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction”); Broad v. DKP Corp., No. 
97 Civ.2029(LAP), 1998 WL 516113, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1998) (noting that “the 
broader teachings of Steel Co. counsel against” use of hypothetical jurisdiction). 
 23 See, e.g., Hardemon v. City of Boston, 144 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1998) (observing that 
only a plurality of Justices in Steel Co. conclusively rejected hypothetical jurisdiction but 
addressing the jurisdictional issue so as not “to test the outer limits of the Court’s 
tolerance”). 
 24 526 U.S. 574 (1999). 
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had articulated the absolute priority of subject matter jurisdiction.  
Ruhrgas held that a federal court, at least under certain 
circumstances, could dismiss a case for lack of personal 
jurisdiction before it had ruled on subject matter jurisdiction.25  
Perhaps most striking was Ruhrgas’s unanimity just one year 
after the Court had divided, at times rancorously, over the 
question of subject matter jurisdiction’s priority. 
The case presented two possible grounds for dismissal—lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction over 
Ruhrgas, a German corporation.26  As the appellate courts involved 
in the Ruhrgas litigation all recognized,27 the question of subject 
matter jurisdiction presented “difficult and novel” issues.28  By 
contrast, the various courts had little trouble concluding that 
Ruhrgas’s contacts with Texas were so insignificant that personal 
jurisdiction clearly was lacking.29 
In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that “there is 
no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy.”30  It rejected the notion 
that “subject-matter jurisdiction is ever and always the more 
‘fundamental’ ” jurisdictional inquiry and held that the rule from 
Steel Co. “does not dictate a sequencing of jurisdictional issues.”31 
While at first blush Ruhrgas seemed confined to the fairly 
narrow proposition that federal courts are not required to decide 
                                                                                                                   
 25 Id. at 578. 
 26 See id. at 580. 
 27 See id. at 588; Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 225 (5th Cir. 1998) (en 
banc), rev’d and remanded by Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 574; id. at 232–33 (Higginbotham, J., 
dissenting). 
 28 Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 588.  Ruhrgas asserted that diversity existed because one 
plaintiff had been joined fraudulently.  See id. at 579–80.  The federal court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction thus turned on the vexing question whether the joinder, in fact, was proper.  
See id. at 581 n.5. 
 29 See Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 182 F.3d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding no 
personal jurisdiction), on remand from Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 574; Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 580–82 
(noting that every court to consider personal jurisdiction found it lacking). 
 30 Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 578 (emphasis added). 
 31 Id. at 584.  The Court also put to rest any lingering doubts about whether Steel Co.’s 
rejection of hypothetical jurisdiction was merely dicta on behalf of a plurality.  The Court 
described Steel Co. as having “adhered to the rule that a federal court may not hypothesize 
subject-matter jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits.”  Id. at 577 (emphasis 
added). 
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subject matter jurisdiction ahead of other jurisdictional rules,32 the 
Court’s logic suggested a much more capacious power to engage in 
jurisdictional sequencing.  Specifically, Ruhrgas posited that the 
heart of the Steel Co. rule lies in the critical distinction between 
“merits” and “non-merits” grounds for dismissal: “ ‘[A] court that 
dismisses on . . . non-merits grounds . . . , before finding subject-
matter jurisdiction, makes no assumption of law-declaring 
power . . . .’  It is hardly novel for a federal court to choose among 
threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.”33  
Since Ruhrgas, that distinction has colored the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdictional-sequencing jurisprudence and influenced most lower 
courts’ interpretation of the Steel Co. rule.34 
3.  Sinochem.  The final case in the jurisdictional-sequencing 
trilogy, Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International 
Shipping Corp.,35 illustrates the expansiveness of the sequencing 
doctrine.  Whereas Ruhrgas had dealt with the order in which a 
court must address different jurisdictional issues, Sinochem 
involved an unambiguously nonjurisdictional question, forum non 
conveniens, a common law doctrine that allows a court to dismiss a 
case when another court (usually in a foreign country) offers a 
clearly superior forum.36 
Once again, the Supreme Court spoke unanimously through 
Justice Ginsburg.  The opinion relied heavily on the notion that a 
federal court must verify subject matter jurisdiction only when it 
                                                                                                                   
 32 See id. at 585 (citing cases and arguing that the decision of jurisdictional-abstention 
questions may precede Article III questions). 
 33 Id. at 584–85 (some alterations in original) (quoting In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 
255 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).  The germ of this idea was present in Steel Co.  See 523 U.S. 83, 101–
02 (1998) (“For a court to pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or 
federal law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra 
vires.” (emphasis added)); see also Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 583 (quoting the previous passage 
from Steel Co. and abbreviating the italicized phrase as “the merits”).  But the concept did 
not gain significant traction until Ruhrgas. 
 34 At least one court has argued that the merits–nonmerits distinction came in dictum.  
Intec USA, LLC v. Engle, 467 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 35 549 U.S. 422 (2007). 
 36 See id. at 426–29.  The parties in Sinochem, both foreign corporations, were contesting 
certain aspects of a lawsuit already pending in a Chinese court.  See id. at 426–27.  
Sinochem moved for a forum non conveniens dismissal, which the district court granted.  Id. 
at 427–28. 
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reaches a case’s underlying merits: “Dismissal short of reaching 
the merits means that the court will not ‘proceed at all’ to an 
adjudication of the cause.”37  Consequently, a federal court may 
dismiss a case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens before 
it verifies subject matter jurisdiction precisely because such a 
dismissal allows “the merits [to] be adjudicated elsewhere”38 and 
“does not entail any assumption by the court of substantive ‘law-
declaring power.’ ”39  Sinochem thus affirmed the notion that a 
federal court may dismiss a case based on a “nonmerits threshold” 
issue,40 even one that is not jurisdictional, before it takes up truly 
jurisdictional questions. 
B.  JURISDICTIONAL SEQUENCING IN THE LOWER COURTS 
Although the outcomes of the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional-
sequencing cases are reconcilable, they created a moving target for 
lower courts.  Some courts have embraced what they view as a 
wide berth to dismiss cases on nonmerits grounds before they 
ensure the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.  Others have 
focused on what they regard as Steel Co.’s announcement of the 
near-absolute priority of subject matter jurisdiction.  Indeed, one 
court has confessed candidly that “it is not always easy to 
determine whether a particular issue is the type of ‘threshold’ 
matter which, if decided adversely to the plaintiff, obviates the 
need to address other threshold questions.”41  Although the 
Supreme Court has articulated a distinction between merits and 
nonmerits issues, lower courts have struggled to apply that 
distinction because it is not grounded in a readily discernible 
vision of subject matter jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                                   
 37 Id. at 431 (quoting Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 577); see also id. (“Both Steel Co. and Ruhrgas 
recognized that a federal court has ‘leeway to choose among threshold grounds for denying 
audience to a case on the merits.’ ” (quoting Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585)). 
 38 Id. at 432. 
 39 Id. at 433 (quoting Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584–85). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2005), abrogated by Levin v. Commerce 
Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323 (2010). 
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1.  Jurisdictional and Quasi-Jurisdictional Questions.  After 
Steel Co. and Ruhrgas, lower courts knew that they could 
prioritize all aspects of subject matter jurisdiction, including both 
Article III and statutory limitations,42 as well as personal 
jurisdiction.  They have been more divided, though, with respect to 
quasi-jurisdictional questions—matters that have a jurisdictional 
flavor but are not in the strictest sense part of a federal court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction.43 
One such quasi-jurisdictional issue is the political question 
doctrine.  In its modern formulation, the doctrine renders a case 
nonjusticiable in federal court when it presents a question that the 
political branches, rather than the judiciary, are most competent 
to resolve.44  After Steel Co. and Ruhrgas, some courts viewed the 
doctrine as a nonmerits threshold issue that “prevent[ed] the 
power of the federal judiciary from being invoked” and thus could 
precede truly jurisdictional questions.45  Other courts, though, 
                                                                                                                   
 42 See, e.g., id. at 1106–07 (holding that Steel Co. required the court to assess 
constitutional and statutory aspects of jurisdiction at the outset); Sierra Club v. Glickman, 
156 F.3d 606, 619 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e do not read [Steel Co.] as making standing the 
threshold issue that a court must address; rather, we read that case as making Article III 
jurisdiction, of which standing, mootness, and ripeness are equally important parts, the 
threshold issue that a court must address.”); see also Gardynski–Leschuck v. Ford Motor 
Co., 142 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir. 1998) (dismissing for failure to satisfy the statutory 
amount-in-controversy requirement). 
 43 Whether justiciability doctrines are truly part of Article III jurisdiction has been a 
subject of debate.  Compare Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178–79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(Bork, J., concurring) (“All of the doctrines that cluster about Article III—not only standing 
but mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like—relate in part, and in different 
though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a 
rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of 
an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.”), with Oryszak v. 
Sullivan, 576 F.3d 522, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that 
justiciability is not a jurisdictional issue).  The Supreme Court in Steel Co. treated one 
justiciability doctrine—standing—as truly jurisdictional.  See 523 U.S. 83, 95–97 (1998). 
 44 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (articulating six factors for determining 
whether a case presents a nonjudiciable political question); see also Rachel E. Barkow, More 
Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial 
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 264–65 (2002) (arguing that the Baker factors capture 
both the “classical” and “prudential” strands of the political question doctrine). 
 45 Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Schlesinger v. 
Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974)); see also Whiteman v. 
Dorotheum GmbH & Co. KG, 431 F.3d 57, 73 n.18 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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interpreted the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional-sequencing cases to 
forbid such a course.46 
Even greater confusion has arisen with respect to the defense of 
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, which 
prevents a state from being sued without its consent.47  The 
Eleventh Amendment defense has some, but not all, of the 
attributes of a truly jurisdictional rule.48  Some courts have held 
that because the Eleventh Amendment is not an essential part of 
subject matter jurisdiction, courts need not resolve sovereign 
immunity questions before they reach a case’s merits.49  By 
contrast, other courts have found that the Eleventh Amendment 
does enjoy priority over merits questions.50  And some circuits 
have been either divided51 or candidly agnostic.52 
                                                                                                                   
 46 E.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345, 348 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Anderman v. Fed. 
Republic of Austria, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1103–05 (C.D. Cal. 2003); see also Whiteman v. 
Fed. Republic of Austria, No. 00 Civ. 8006(SWK), 2002 WL 31368236, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 
21, 2002) (noting that jurisdictional matters must precede the political question issue). 
 47 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 48 See Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394–95 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (noting the “hybrid nature” of the Eleventh Amendment); Calderon v. Ashmus, 
523 U.S. 740, 745 n.2 (1998) (noting that “the Eleventh Amendment . . . is not coextensive 
with the limitations on judicial power in Article III”); see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe 
of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) (noting that sovereign immunity is waivable); Patsy v. 
Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 n.19 (1982) (noting that a court need not raise a 
sovereign immunity defense sua sponte). 
 49 See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., 639 F.3d 1078, 1084–85 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United 
States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780 (2000)) (observing “considerable uncertainty about 
sequencing in the Eleventh Amendment context”); In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., 335 F.3d 
243, 250 (3d Cir. 2003); Strawser v. Atkins, 290 F.3d 720, 730 (4th Cir. 2002); Gordon v. 
City of Kansas City, Mo., 241 F.3d 997, 1005 n.7 (8th Cir. 2001); Floyd v. Thompson, 227 
F.3d 1029, 1035 (7th Cir. 2000); United States ex rel. Long v. S.C.S. Bus. & Technical Inst., 
Inc., 173 F.3d 890, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Parella v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Emp’s.’ Ret. Sys., 173 
F.3d 46, 53–57 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 50 See, e.g., Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120, 1126 (10th Cir. 1999); In re Jackson, 184 
F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 285–86 (5th 
Cir. 1999); Seaborn v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 143 F.3d 1405, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 51 Compare Tyler v. Douglas, 280 F.3d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (resolving the case on the 
merits rather than sovereign immunity), with Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61, 66–67 (2d Cir. 
2000) (determining that immunity must be addressed before the merits). 
 52 See Nair v. Oakland Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 476 (6th Cir. 
2006) (stating “we need not decide the [sequencing] point because there is a narrower 
ground for decision”).  In the Eleventh Amendment context, most courts confronted the flip-
side of the jurisdictional-sequencing question—which issues must a court resolve before 
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2.  Nonjurisdictional Questions.  The division among lower 
courts has been even more pronounced with respect to clearly 
nonjurisdictional issues.  Some courts long had found within the 
inherent logic of Steel Co. an ability to dismiss a case on a variety 
of threshold grounds before addressing jurisdiction.  One of the 
iconic expositions of the point came from the D.C. Circuit in the 
brief interval between Steel Co. and Ruhrgas.  It attempted to give 
content to what qualifies as a nonmerits dismissal. 
 What is beyond the power of courts lacking 
jurisdiction is adjudication on the merits, the act of 
deciding the case. . . . 
. . . . 
 Forum non conveniens does not raise a jurisdictional 
bar but instead involves a deliberate abstention from 
the exercise of jurisdiction.  While such abstention 
may appear logically to rest on an assumption of 
jurisdiction, it is as merits-free as a finding of no 
jurisdiction.53 
Although the Second Circuit agreed with that approach,54 the Fifth 
Circuit held that granting a forum non conveniens dismissal before 
establishing subject matter jurisdiction would indulge in the 
forbidden practice of “hypothetical jurisdiction.”55 
Courts have reached similarly disparate conclusions regarding 
other nonjurisdictional issues.  For instance, some courts have 
resolved questions about the propriety of venue before addressing 
subject matter jurisdiction;56 others have held that such an 
                                                                                                                   
reaching the merits.  Some scholars have begun to grapple with that question.  See, e.g., 
Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2008).  But the circuit split regarding 
the nature of the Eleventh Amendment applies equally to the jurisdictional-sequencing 
context. 
 53 In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 
 54 See Arbitration Between Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of 
Ukr., 311 F.3d 488, 498 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 55 See Dominguez–Cota v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 396 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2005), 
abrogated by Sinochem, 549 U.S. 422 (2007). 
 56 E.g., In re LimitNone, LLC, 551 F.3d 572, 577–78 (7th Cir. 2008); Buchanan v. Manley, 
145 F.3d 386, 389 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Stewart v. May Dep’t Store Co., No. Civ.A. 
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approach is impermissible.57  Some courts have treated a party’s 
failure to satisfy the requirements of a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure as a nonmerits threshold ground for dismissal,58 while 
other courts have held that dismissals on the basis of certain 
Federal Rules may not leapfrog a determination of subject matter 
jurisdiction.59 
Other threshold issues that some courts have reached at the 
outset of a case include ripeness,60 failure to preserve a claim,61 
failure to satisfy a prerequisite for equitable relief,62 preclusion,63 
failure to raise a claim,64 and certain forms of exhaustion.65  
Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit has held that a rule designed to 
“preclude judicial inquiry” is a “non-merits threshold ground for 
dismissal” that may precede a determination of subject matter 
jurisdiction.66  By contrast, other courts have held, or at least 
                                                                                                                   
02-2772, 2002 WL 31844906, at *2 n.1 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 2002) (granting motion to transfer 
before deciding subject matter jurisdiction). 
 57 See, e.g., Simmang v. Tex. Bd. of Law Exam’rs, No. Civ. 3:03-CV-0740-H, 2003 WL 
22119511, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2003); Nwanze v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 97 CIV. 
7344(LBS), 1999 WL 292620, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 1999). 
 58 See, e.g., Potter v. Hughes, 546 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (demand requirement of 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1); Kelley v. City of Albuquerque, 542 F.3d 802, 818 n.15 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b)); Kramer v. 
Gates, 481 F.3d 788, 791 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (relief from judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 
60(b)(6)); Payton v. Cnty. of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 2002) (class certification 
under FED. R. CIV. P. 23). 
 59 See, e.g., Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2005) (indispensable party 
under FED. R. CIV. P. 19), abrogated by Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323 
(2010); Rivera v. Wyeth–Ayerst Labs., 283 F.3d 315, 319 n.6 (5th Cir. 2002) (class 
certification under FED. R. CIV. P. 23). 
 60 See, e.g., Toca Producers v. FERC, 411 F.3d 262, 265 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Presitex USA 
Inc. v. United States, 674 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1378 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010). 
 61 See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. FERC, 485 F.3d 1164, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 62 See, e.g., Hodgers–Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1042 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(finding that plaintiff could not demonstrate irreparable injury). 
 63 See, e.g., Davis Int’l, LLC v. New Start Grp. Corp., 488 F.3d 597, 604 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(direct estoppel). 
 64 See, e.g., Cruz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 356 F.3d 320, 330–31 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 65 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 824 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (prudential 
exhaustion); Long Term Care Partners, LLC v. United States, 516 F.3d 225, 232–33 (4th 
Cir. 2008) (inapplicability of a nonstatutory exception to the Administrative Procedure Act’s 
requirement of final agency action). 
 66 Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 486 F.3d 1342, 1343, 1347–49 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(quoting Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (2005)) (dismissing a case under the Marshall Field 
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intimated, that they may not decide preclusion questions67 or the 
propriety of a forum non conveniens dismissal (when federal 
jurisdiction is based on removal)68 before they verify subject 
matter jurisdiction.  And the status of class certification rulings, 
for purposes of jurisdictional sequencing, remains particularly 
thorny.69 
As a general matter, the D.C.,70 First,71 and Second72 Circuits 
have tended to take the most expansive view of the nonmerits 
threshold issues that courts may decide before they reach subject 
matter jurisdiction.  On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit typically 
has adhered to what it regards as the virtually ironclad 
presumption that federal courts should decide subject matter 
jurisdiction ahead of all else.73 
The division outlined above suggests pervasive confusion about 
which issues qualify as nonmerits threshold grounds for dismissal.  
                                                                                                                   
doctrine, which provides that attestations of presiding officers of the House and Senate are 
conclusive of what Congress passed, thus foreclosing further judicial inquiry on that point). 
 67 See, e.g., Envtl. Conservation Org. v. City of Dallas, 529 F.3d 519, 525 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 68 See, e.g., Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087–88 
(9th Cir. 2009). 
 69 See, e.g., Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Nomura Asset Acceptance 
Corp., 632 F.3d 762, 768–71 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting tension in Supreme Court and lower 
court cases as to the priority of Article III vis-à-vis Rule 23’s requirements). 
 70 In addition to Papandreou, Cruz, Hwang Geum Joo, and Kramer, see supra notes 53, 
64, 45, and 58 respectively, see also Galvan v. Federal Prison Industries, Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 
463 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 71 See, e.g., Restoration Pres. Masonry, Inc. v. Grove Eur., Ltd., 325 F.3d 54, 59–60 (1st 
Cir. 2003); Seale v. INS, 323 F.3d 150, 155–57 (1st Cir. 2003); Davignon v. Clemmey, 322 
F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Woods, 210 F.3d 70, 74 n.2 (1st Cir. 2000); Kelly 
v. Marcantonio, 187 F.3d 192, 197 (1st Cir. 1999); Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emp’s.’ Ret. 
Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 54–55 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 72 See, e.g., Alliance for Envtl. Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid Crossgates Co., 436 F.3d 82, 87 
(2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Canova, 412 F.3d 331, 348 (2d Cir. 2005); Fama v. Comm’r 
of Corr. Servs., 235 F.3d 804, 816 n.11 (2d Cir. 2000); Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 182 (2d 
Cir. 2000); In re O’Brien, 184 F.3d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 73 In addition to Dominguez–Cota and Rivera, see supra notes 55 and 59 respectively, see 
also United States v. Texas Tech University, 171 F.3d 279, 286–88 (5th Cir. 1999), and the 
Ruhrgas en banc opinion, Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 225 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(en banc), rev’d and remanded by Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 574 (1999).  But see Carey v. Sub Sea 
Int’l, Inc., No. 99-40793, 2000 WL 329367, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 2000) (finding that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by resolving personal jurisdiction before subject 
matter jurisdiction). 
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That confusion has resulted from the failure to root jurisdictional 
sequencing in a coherent vision of subject matter jurisdiction. 
III.  THEORIES OF JURISDICTIONAL SEQUENCING 
Having surveyed the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional-sequencing 
trilogy and lower courts’ often fitful attempts to apply those 
decisions, I turn in this Part to the various theories of 
jurisdictional sequencing that scholars and judges have advanced.  
A viable theory is necessary as a practical guide for lower courts 
that continue to struggle to discern which issues may precede 
subject matter jurisdiction in the decisional hierarchy.  Moreover, 
from a conceptual perspective, a coherent theory of jurisdictional 
sequencing is essential to justify the doctrine’s very existence and 
refute suggestions that it is an unprincipled shortcut or, even 
worse, an illegitimate exercise of judicial power. 
Such a theory must be grounded in a well-defined notion of 
what subject matter jurisdiction protects and, just as important, 
what it does not protect.  Too often courts and scholars fall back on 
the trope that without jurisdiction a court has no “power to act at 
all.”74  But a literal prohibition against doing anything in the 
absence of subject matter jurisdiction makes no sense and never 
has been true.75  Surely a court always can perform routine docket-
management functions—assigning a docket number to a case, 
scheduling a hearing, etc.—before inquiring into subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Courts also have some inherent authority over cases, 
extending perhaps to entering discovery and pleading orders (and 
sanctioning lawyers for failure to comply with them).76  Moreover, 
                                                                                                                   
 74 Idleman, supra note 1, at 32; see also Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“Without 
jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.” (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); Davis v. Passman, 442 
U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) (“Thus it may be said that jurisdiction is a question of whether a 
federal court has the power, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, to hear a 
case . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
 75 For instance, even before ascertaining subject matter jurisdiction, courts may impose 
sanctions, Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136–39 (1992), and hold parties in 
contempt, United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 289–95 (1947). 
 76 See Steinman, supra note 8, at 872; Idleman, supra note 1, at 47–56 (describing 
inherent powers that are “designed to operate in the absence of verified subject-matter 
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courts always have metajurisdictional power—jurisdiction to 
determine their own jurisdiction.77  The question, then, is not 
whether courts may exercise certain judicial authority before they 
verify jurisdiction, but what kind of actions are inappropriate.  
That inquiry must inform any theory of jurisdictional sequencing. 
In this Part, I organize scholarly and judicial treatments into a 
taxonomy of four theories.  These theories do not accurately 
describe the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional-sequencing trilogy.  
More importantly, they don’t offer a satisfying normative vision of 
subject matter jurisdiction’s precise role, which I argue is 
exclusively structural.  The taxonomy thus demonstrates the need 
for a new theory, which I develop in Part IV based on the 
dichotomy of conduct rules and allocative rules. 
A.  PRAGMATIC THEORY 
Some scholars and judges regard subject matter jurisdiction 
largely as a pragmatic concept that helps ensure the adjudication 
of actual controversies, the decision of only necessary questions, 
and minimization of the risk of judicial error.  According to this 
theory, a jurisdiction-first rule is a way to effectuate certain 
judicial values, such as efficiency and judicial restraint.  On the 
other hand, pragmatists assert, courts should not slavishly adhere 
to the rule when doing so would compromise those values. 
Efficiency always has been among pragmatism’s chief concerns.  
Deciding jurisdictional questions first usually fosters efficiency 
because a jurisdictional dismissal at the outset prevents courts 
from devoting time and resources to other aspects of the case.  But 
occasionally a difficult jurisdictional question might consume more 
resources than an alternative route to dismissal.78  Those 
efficiency concerns are particularly acute when a jurisdictional 
problem comes to light for the first time on appeal but the 
                                                                                                                   
jurisdiction”); see also Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 
1987) (“[A] court . . . may engage in all the usual judicial acts, even though it has not power 
to decide the case on the merits.”). 
 77 See infra notes 144–45 and accompanying text. 
 78 See Elliott, supra note 9, at 729 (discussing the efficiency rationale of hypothetical 
jurisdiction); Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 111 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (same). 
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appellate court recognizes an alternative ground for dismissal.  
Either way, the lawsuit is destined for dismissal, but the 
nonjurisdictional course spares a potentially expensive, though 
ultimately irrelevant, remand.79 
Justice Breyer argued in Steel Co. that taking a flexible 
approach to jurisdiction “makes enormous practical sense,” 
especially when a court confronts an “intractable” jurisdictional 
question and “(assuming an easy answer on the substantive 
merits) the same party would win or lose regardless.”80  Similarly, 
scholars also have noted that policing an unyielding jurisdictional 
hierarchy is an “expensive habit”81 and have extolled the efficiency 
gains of a more pragmatic approach to jurisdiction.82 
Beyond efficiency gains, scholars have argued that pragmatism 
fosters judicial restraint.83  In most circumstances, addressing 
subject matter jurisdiction first is the restrained approach because 
it ensures that a court will venture into substantive law—and 
render precedential decisions on such law—only when it has 
legitimate authority to do so.  But in some cases restraint might 
require a court to address the merits first.84  Circumventing 
                                                                                                                   
 79 See, e.g., Decker & Co. v. West, 76 F.3d 1573, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting the futility 
of remand on the jurisdictional question); Mitchell v. W. Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 507 F.2d 
662, 666–67 (5th Cir. 1975) (same); see also Forster v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 
1146, 1147 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting the practical irrelevance of a potential jurisdictional 
defect discovered on appeal). 
 80 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 111 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 81 David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute: Part II, 36 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 268, 298 (1969); see also Idleman, supra note 1, at 71–72 (arguing that while 
jurisdictional hierarchies may be costly, such costs are justified). 
 82 See, e.g., Friedenthal, supra note 5, at 270 (arguing that when deciding the 
jurisdictional question would be a “colossal waste of time and there are no serious concerns 
about compromising state courts’ powers regarding the substantive law involved, a belated 
dismissal makes little sense” and that “[t]here will be no violence to the separation of 
powers if in an occasional case justice triumphs over rigidly applied rules of procedure”); 
Sherry, supra note 5, at 127 (arguing that requiring courts to decide “difficult—but 
ultimately irrelevant—issues” compromises efficiency). 
 83 E.g., Elliott, supra note 9, at 742–46; Sherry, supra note 5, at 128; Steinman, supra 
note 8, at 912–13.  But see Idleman, supra note 5, at 248–49 (criticizing the restraint 
rationale as “questionable”). 
 84 See, e.g., Browning–Ferris Indus. of S. Jersey, Inc. v. Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151, 152 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (“In the interests of judicial restraint . . . , we prefer to assume colorable 
jurisdiction for the purposes of this appeal only, without deciding the jurisdictional 
questions.”). 
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difficult jurisdictional questions that ultimately have no bearing 
on the outcome of a case arguably promotes restraint as courts are 
able “to avoid complex questions about the margins of their 
power.”85 
From a purely explanatory perspective, though, pragmatism 
fails to describe the jurisdictional-sequencing cases.  Admittedly, a 
robust jurisdiction-first principle never has been inviolate,86 and 
the Court’s adherence to such a rule has been “inconsistent.”87  The 
majority in Steel Co. acknowledged as much.88  But proponents of a 
strong view of pragmatism note that their vision would allow 
courts to go even further and pass over difficult jurisdictional 
questions to reach other straightforward issues, including the 
merits of the case.89  The jurisdictional-sequencing trilogy has 
rejected that idea explicitly and prohibited a “rul[ing] on the 
merits of a case without first determining . . . subject-matter 
jurisdiction.”90 
The pragmatic theory is also normatively problematic.  If the 
ultimate question is what a court should refrain from doing before 
it has established subject matter jurisdiction, pragmatism offers 
little guidance.  Essentially, a strong theory of pragmatism tells 
courts to pick the surest ground of decision, regardless of whether 
it is jurisdictional, procedural, or merits-based.  While such an 
approach might effectuate notions of judicial restraint, it does 
little to clarify what subject matter jurisdiction specifically 
protects. 
The pragmatic approach seems to treat judicial restraint and 
efficiency as the highest values and jurisdictional rules simply as a 
means to that end.  Even its proponents intuit that this can’t be 
                                                                                                                   
 85 Elliott, supra note 9, at 746. 
 86 See Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 532 (1976) (noting the occasional practice of 
departing from a jurisdiction-first rule); see also Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, 110–11 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring); id. at 111 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 87 Sherry, supra note 5, at 128. 
 88 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101 (majority opinion); id. at 110–11 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 89 See id.at 111–12 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); Friedenthal, supra note 5, at 
269–70. 
 90 Sinochem, 549 U.S. 422, 430–31 (2007) (emphasis added); see also Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 
574, 583 (1999). 
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quite right.  Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Steel Co. illustrates 
the dilemma.  He agreed that “federal courts often, and typically 
should, decide standing questions at the outset of a case”91 but 
then made clear that, in his view, the Constitution does not 
require courts to resolve subject matter jurisdiction questions first 
“when doing so would cause serious practical problems.”92  If the 
usual jurisdiction-first rule derives from the Constitution, what 
justifies exceptions besides “practical problems”?  Alternatively, if 
the jurisdiction-first rule is not a constitutional imperative, why 
insist that courts “typically should” resolve jurisdictional questions 
first? 
The strong view of pragmatism advanced by Justice Breyer 
cannot elucidate why jurisdiction is unique vis-à-vis procedural or 
merits questions, even though he says that it is.  A weaker view of 
pragmatism accepts the Court’s prohibition against deciding 
merits questions before jurisdiction but otherwise permits a court 
to choose the easiest “threshold” ground for dismissal.  It also 
acknowledges, but cannot explain, the usual presumption in favor 
of deciding jurisdiction first.93 
As most courts and scholars recognize, though, there is 
something inherently special about subject matter jurisdiction, 
however ethereal that “something” might be.94  Courts that have 
taken an expansive approach to jurisdictional sequencing still 
acknowledge that subject matter jurisdiction is a unique, 
constitutional prerequisite for the exercise of certain powers.95  
Indeed, federal courts have an independent obligation to police 
subject matter jurisdiction.96  Even scholars who have argued that 
                                                                                                                   
 91 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 111 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 92 Id. 
 93 See Elliott, supra note 9, at 743 (arguing that a court should decide a jurisdictional 
question first unless it is “appreciably more complicated than [another] threshold 
question”). 
 94 See infra Part III.B–D. 
 95 See In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255–56 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that subject 
matter jurisdiction protects separation of powers and is a prerequisite to the exercise of 
certain judicial power); see also Kramer v. Gates, 481 F.3d 788, 791 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Cruz v. 
Am. Airlines, Inc., 356 F.3d 320, 330–31 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 96 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the Court determines at any time that it lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). 
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subject matter jurisdiction is more malleable than judicial rhetoric 
suggests nonetheless argue that jurisdiction performs both “a 
structural role” and “an expressive role in affirming that certain 
limitations are important or fundamental.”97  Consequently, clarity 
about the structural nature of subject matter jurisdiction is 
important, especially its role in restraining courts from intruding 
on the law-making realm that the political branches normally 
occupy.  That more robust and concrete understanding of 
jurisdiction’s structural role gives content to pragmatists’ inchoate, 
but correct, intuition that subject matter jurisdiction is unique.  It 
also lays the groundwork for a better conceptualization of 
jurisdictional sequencing. 
B.  EQUIVALENCE THEORY 
The second theory of jurisdictional sequencing is the 
equivalence theory, according to which courts may prioritize an 
issue that is sufficiently equivalent to subject matter jurisdiction.  
Scott Idleman developed the contours of the equivalence theory 
based on a parsing of Ruhrgas.98  Although the theory represents 
Idleman’s good faith interpretation of Ruhrgas, Idleman makes 
clear that he finds the theory specious.99 
According to Idleman’s reading of Ruhrgas, two overarching 
questions must guide a court’s assessment of whether it may 
consider an issue ahead of subject matter jurisdiction.  First, is the 
issue “equivalent” to subject matter and personal jurisdiction?100  
That question turns principally on whether an issue is “essential” 
to a court’s legitimate authority to adjudicate a case.101  Second, 
                                                                                                                   
 97 Dodson, supra note 3, at 1482; see also Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 971, 1022–26 (2009) (discussing values promoted by jurisdiction). 
 98 See Idleman, supra note 1, at 11; see also Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (noting 
that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction,” like subject matter jurisdiction, “is ‘an essential element of the 
jurisdiction of a district . . . court,’ without which the court is ‘powerless to proceed to an 
adjudication.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Emp’rs Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 
U.S. 374, 382 (1937))). 
 99 See Idleman, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
 100 Id. at 11. 
 101 Id. at 12–13.  Idleman also noted Ruhrgas’s reference to the fact that personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction are both rooted in the Constitution but doubted whether “the 
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should a court “resequence” the issue ahead of subject matter 
jurisdiction?102  The second question depends on the relative 
difficulty of the issues as well as other institutional interests, such 
as judicial economy and judicial restraint.103 
The equivalence theory lacks explanatory power, however, 
because the first prong never has had much purchase.  The 
Supreme Court has signaled that federal courts may prioritize a 
host of threshold questions that, even under the most capacious 
definition, are not equivalent to subject matter jurisdiction.  For 
example, a forum non conveniens decision, which Sinochem 
permits, is not essential to a court’s adjudicatory authority.  
Unlike subject matter and personal jurisdiction, forum non 
conveniens is not jurisdictional (or even quasi-jurisdictional) but is 
purely discretionary.  Similarly, lower courts have approved 
dismissals based on preclusion principles,104 failure to raise a 
claim,105 and failure to preserve a claim,106 none of which is an 
“essential element” of a court’s adjudicatory power.107  At most, an 
issue’s equivalence to subject matter jurisdiction might be a 
sufficient condition for a court to decide that issue at the outset, 
but by no means is it a necessary condition. 
The relevance of the second prong—weighing the difficulty of 
the issues—is doubtful.  Although Ruhrgas and several lower court 
decisions have focused on the relative difficulty of the subject 
matter jurisdiction question as a precondition for deciding another 
issue first,108 the Supreme Court does not always treat such 
                                                                                                                   
element of constitutionality” was “truly necessary” to the Ruhrgas decision or just a 
makeweight argument.  Id. at 75–77. 
 102 Id. at 11. 
 103 Id. at 14, 17. 
 104 E.g., Davis Int’l, LLC v. New Start Grp. Corp., 488 F.3d 597, 604 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 105 E.g., Cruz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 356 F.3d 320, 330–31 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 106 E.g., Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. FERC, 485 F.3d 1164, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 107 Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999). 
 108 See id. at 588; see also Envtl. Conservation Org. v. City of Dallas, 529 F.3d 519, 525 
(5th Cir. 2008) (holding that mootness should be addressed first because a res judicata 
analysis was “no less burdensome”); Lolavar v. de Santibanes, 430 F.3d 221, 227 (4th Cir. 
2005) (noting that jurisdictional sequencing is permitted only when subject matter 
jurisdiction is “complex and perhaps difficult”); Gadlin v. Sybron Int’l Corp., 222 F.3d 797, 
799 (10th Cir. 2000) (interpreting Ruhrgas to require that a relatively straightforward 
question of subject matter jurisdiction be addressed first). 
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balancing as integral to the sequencing analysis.  In 2010, the 
Court dismissed a case on the ground of comity and observed in 
passing that it did not need to resolve the issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction.109  Justice Thomas objected to that approach, arguing 
that the jurisdictional inquiry was not difficult and that the Court 
should not circumvent it.110  His view commanded only two votes, 
though, suggesting that the relative difficulty of the jurisdictional 
inquiry might not be a hard-and-fast prerequisite for jurisdictional 
sequencing. 
From a normative perspective, the theory is even more fraught 
with problems, many of which Idleman identifies.  For starters, it 
is not clear that personal jurisdiction is meaningfully equivalent to 
subject matter jurisdiction.  The Court in Ruhrgas acknowledged 
that subject matter and personal jurisdiction evince significant 
differences in their underlying purposes, origins, and character.111  
Subject matter jurisdiction is an institutional constraint that 
derives from Article III of the Constitution and restricts judicial 
power as a matter of sovereignty; consequently, subject matter 
jurisdiction (at least in its constitutional dimension) is a 
nonwaivable constraint that both the parties and the court may 
raise at any time before final judgment.112  By contrast, personal 
jurisdiction derives from the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments and protects a person’s liberty 
interests.113  Thus, unlike a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a 
defect in personal jurisdiction is waivable and forfeitable.114  
Precisely because personal jurisdiction is not an absolute 
prerequisite to the exercise of judicial power, it is not on par with 
subject matter jurisdiction.115 
                                                                                                                   
 109 See Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323, 2336–37 (2010) (citing Sinochem, 
549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007)). 
 110 See id. at 2337–39 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 111 Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 583–84. 
 112 See id.; Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 
(1982); see also Idleman, supra note 1, at 31–33. 
 113 See Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 702–03 & n.10; see also Idleman, supra note 1, at 33. 
 114 See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584; Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 702–03; Idleman, supra note 
1, at 36. 
 115 See Idleman, supra note 1, at 32–33, 39, 74 (explaining why personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction “are most assuredly not equivalent”). 
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One might try to save the equivalence theory from internal 
inconsistency by adopting a broader definition of equivalence that 
includes any issue that “must be demonstrated before a federal 
court can adjudicate a dispute.”116  That approach effectively would 
reduce the equivalence theory to the question of “essentiality,” but 
it exposes an even deeper normative difficulty.  Leaving aside any 
uncertainty about whether particular issues qualify as 
“essential”—for example, comity, exhaustion requirements, and 
prudential abstention doctrines117—some threshold questions 
probably are not essential because they are discretionary.  For 
instance, in the forum non conveniens context, the lack of a more 
convenient forum is not a prerequisite for the exercise of judicial 
power;118 thus, that threshold issue probably is not essential.  Why 
certain threshold issues that seek to delimit federal judicial power 
should fall on one side of a blurry line seems arbitrary and does 
not correspond with any robust theoretical doctrine.119 
The overarching normative problem associated with any 
formulation of the equivalence theory is its inability to explain 
why any of the line-drawing matters.  The pertinent question is 
not whether a particular issue is equivalent to subject matter 
jurisdiction or otherwise essential to adjudication.  Instead, a 
theory of jurisdictional sequencing should begin by asking what 
jurisdiction protects.  Idleman’s criticism of the equivalence theory 
starts to address that underlying problem by noting that subject 
matter jurisdiction is a structural limitation on federal courts, but 
                                                                                                                   
 116 Id. at 74. 
 117 See, e.g., Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d 483, 497–98 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(describing Colorado River abstention as a “prudential” doctrine); Garcia v. Akwesasne 
Hous. Auth., 268 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that an exhaustion requirement is a 
“matter of comity” that “does not impair jurisdiction”). 
 118 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1981) (emphasizing that forum 
non conveniens is a “flexib[le]” and “discretion[ary]” doctrine that is not governed by “a rigid 
rule”). 
 119 One might argue that any discretionary limitation, such as forum non conveniens, is 
less essential than an objection that, if properly invoked, is nondiscretionary.  But such a 
distinction seems far less important, and thus less relevant to “essentiality,” than the 
distinction between waivable and nonwaivable rules or the distinction between issues that a 
court may raise sua sponte and those that it may not.  The equivalence theory gives no 
reason for preferring one distinction over another. 
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when describing what that limitation guards, he makes only vague 
appeals to federal sovereignty.120  While his formulation might be 
correct at a high level of abstraction, it does not advance the 
discussion very much.  As I argue in Part IV, subject matter 
jurisdiction is a specific limitation on courts’ authority to 
adjudicate conduct rules.  With that idea of jurisdiction’s role 
squarely in mind, questions about an issue’s equivalence or 
essentiality become irrelevant.  Instead, the focus should remain 
on whether resolving a particular issue will implicate subject 
matter jurisdiction’s specific concerns. 
C.  ARTICLE III THEORY 
A number of courts have interpreted the jurisdictional-
sequencing cases to accord absolute priority to Article III subject 
matter jurisdiction but not statutory limitations that Congress has 
imposed.121  The First Circuit proffered the Article III theory in 
1999: “[T]he decision in Steel Co. ‘distinguishes between Article III 
jurisdiction questions and statutory jurisdiction questions, holding 
that the former should ordinarily be decided before the merits, but 
the latter need not be.’ ”122  The First Circuit has adhered to the 
Article III theory of jurisdictional sequencing since then,123 as have 
several other courts.124 
                                                                                                                   
 120 See Idleman, supra note 1, at 32–33. 
 121 In the immediate aftermath of Steel Co., Idleman anticipated this development.  See 
Idleman, supra note 5, at 318–20 (noting the narrow view that Steel Co. concerned only the 
priority of Article III jurisdiction). 
 122 Kelly v. Marcantonio, 187 F.3d 192, 197 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Parella v. Ret. Bd. of 
R.I. Emp’s.’ Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir.1999)). 
 123 E.g., Davignon v. Clemmey, 322 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Woods, 210 
F.3d 70, 74 n.2 (1st Cir. 2000).  
 124 See, e.g., Chalabi v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 543 F.3d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(holding that jurisdictional sequencing rules apply only to Article III, but not statutory, 
jurisdictional requirements); Kramer v. Gates, 481 F.3d 788, 791 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (same); 
United States v. Canova, 412 F.3d 331, 348 (2d Cir. 2005) (same); Perdeaux v. United 
States, 338 F.3d 137, 139 n.3 (2d Cir. 2003) (same); Fama v. Comm’r of Corr. Servs., 235 
F.3d 804, 816 n.11 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 182 n.3 (2d Cir. 
2000) (same); see also Larsen v. Senate of Pennsylvania, 152 F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(emphasizing that Steel Co. prioritized Article III jurisdiction). 
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Lower courts have based the Article III theory on several 
passages from the majority opinion in Steel Co., which rejected 
“the proposition that the court can reach a merits question when 
there is no Article III jurisdiction.”125  The majority chastised 
Justice Stevens for failing to cite a case in which the Court had 
decided whether a cause of action existed “before resolving a 
dispute concerning the existence of an Article III case or 
controversy.”126  And the Court acknowledged that certain 
precedents had “diluted the absolute purity of the rule that Article 
III jurisdiction is always an antecedent question.”127 
As with the other theories explored in this Part, the problems 
with the Article III theory are both descriptive and normative.  
First, from a purely descriptive viewpoint, Steel Co. does not 
unambiguously lend itself to a reading that differentiates between 
Article III jurisdiction and other limits on subject matter 
jurisdiction.  At the end of the Court’s disquisition on hypothetical 
jurisdiction, the opinion appeared to articulate the priority of all 
subject matter jurisdiction issues, regardless of their source: “The 
statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction 
are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of 
powers.”128  Scholars have noted this tension within the Steel Co. 
opinion, which seems to distinguish Article III and statutory 
limitations on jurisdiction and then, in the next breath, eliminate 
the significance of any such distinction.129 
Furthermore, Ruhrgas suggests that the Article III theory does 
not represent the best reading of the jurisdictional-sequencing 
                                                                                                                   
 125 Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, 97 n.2 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis 
added); see also id. at 100–01 n.3 (observing that Justice Stevens’s concurrence cited no case 
in which the Court had “decid[ed] the merits before a disputed question of Article III 
jurisdiction” (emphasis added)). 
 126 Id. at 92 (emphasis added); see also id. at 95 (arguing that the concurrence erred by 
“asserting that a court may decide the cause of action before resolving Article III 
jurisdiction” (emphasis added)). 
 127 Id. at 101 (emphasis added). 
 128 Id. 
 129 See Steinman, supra note 8, at 860–62 (concluding that “the Court has laid the 
groundwork for playing Steel Co. either way”); Friedenthal, supra note 5, at 264–65 (noting 
“Justice Scalia’s apparent wandering” between the priority of all limits on subject matter 
jurisdiction and only the constitutional limits). 
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cases.  If the Court simply meant to articulate the priority of 
Article III’s case or controversy requirement, Ruhrgas would have 
been a very straightforward case.  Recall that the gnarly question 
of subject matter jurisdiction in Ruhrgas was whether the parties 
were completely diverse.  Because one of the plaintiffs (Norge, a 
Norwegian corporation) and the defendant (Ruhrgas, a German 
corporation) were both aliens, the plaintiffs argued that complete 
diversity was not satisfied.130  But the Supreme Court has made 
clear that the complete diversity mandate stems only from the 
diversity jurisdiction statute.131  Article III is more permissive and 
requires only minimal diversity.  As long as any two opposing 
parties are diverse from one another, that requirement is met.132  
The Ruhrgas parties satisfied Article III’s minimal diversity 
requirement because, aside from Norge, the other plaintiffs were 
domestic corporations and thus were diverse from the foreign 
defendant.133  If Steel Co. simply had forbidden the decision of any 
issue ahead of an Article III question, Ruhrgas would have been 
far easier—there was obviously minimal diversity (thus complying 
with Article III), and the courts could have proceeded directly to 
the question of personal jurisdiction without any fuss.134 
The Article III theory also presents normative difficulties.  
Although the First Circuit has noted that the theory comports with 
the canon of constitutional avoidance,135 courts generally have 
                                                                                                                   
 130 See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 574, 578 n.1, 580 (1999).  The dispute concerned whether Norge 
had been joined fraudulently.  See id. at 581 n.5.  If it had, and if Norge were dismissed 
from the action, then there would have been complete diversity.  See id. at 580 n.2. 
 131 See id. at 584; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (providing for diversity jurisdiction); 
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (interpreting the statute to require 
complete diversity). 
 132 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967). 
 133 See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 578 n.1 (noting the parties’ citizenship). 
 134 Similarly, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake 
Michigan Railway Co. v. Swan, which Steel Co. and Ruhrgas both cite for the priority of 
subject matter jurisdiction, pertained only to the statutory requirement of complete 
diversity since the constitutional requirement of minimal diversity clearly was satisfied.  
111 U.S. 379, 381–82 (1884); see also Friedenthal, supra note 5, at 264–65. 
 135 See Kelly v. Marcantonio, 187 F.3d 192, 197 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[T]he relevant maxim 
outside the Article III context ‘is not that federal courts cannot act without first establishing 
their jurisdiction, but rather that courts should not reach constitutional questions in 
advance of the necessity of deciding them.’ ” (quoting Parella v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Emp’s.’ 
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grounded it only in a close reading of Steel Co., rather than a 
robust conceptual or theoretical defense.  Perhaps the most that 
can be said for the theory is that constitutional restrictions on 
subject matter jurisdiction are more fundamental than statutory 
restrictions to the extent that Congress can alter purely statutory 
limits.  But that argument is strained, precisely because Congress 
thus far has not altered those statutory restrictions or permitted 
courts to circumvent them.136  If Congress has imposed a truly 
jurisdictional requirement, courts have a duty to police that 
restriction just as rigorously as a constitutional limitation.137 
The larger conceptual problem, as with the other theories 
discussed in this Part, is that the Article III theory fails to grapple 
with the question of what subject matter jurisdiction protects.  
Despite the pellucid clarity of the line that the theory draws, that 
line seems arbitrary and untethered to any vision of subject 
matter jurisdiction’s unique structural role.  There is no 
meaningful structural difference between constitutional and 
statutory restrictions, even though Congress can relax the latter 
more easily.  Instead, the focus should remain on what kind of 
action a court may not take before it verifies subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Consequently, differentiating between constitutional 
and statutory restrictions on jurisdiction is an unhelpful 
distraction from the main issues on which jurisdictional 
sequencing should turn. 
D.  PRESENT LITIGANT THEORY 
The final theory of jurisdictional sequencing that scholars have 
put forward posits that a federal court must verify subject matter 
jurisdiction before it renders a decision that binds the litigants in a 
case.  It rests on the idea that preclusion principles, including both 
                                                                                                                   
Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 56 (1st Cir. 1999))). 
 136 Cf. Steinman, supra note 8, at 940–41 (noting Congress’s power to make certain 
requirements nonjurisdictional); Dodson, Mandatory Rules, supra note 52, at 9–11 (noting 
Congress’s power to create truly jurisdictional rules and less rigid mandatory rules). 
 137 See Steinman, supra note 8, at 939 (arguing that statutory limits “are of sufficient 
stature, by virtue of their source, and of sufficient importance as a matter of policy, that 
they too should not be subject to judicial circumvention”). 
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issue preclusion138 and claim preclusion,139 should inform 
jurisdictional sequencing.  Unlike the other theories discussed in 
this Part, the present litigant theory grapples with subject matter 
jurisdiction’s precise role.  The theory is predicated on the idea 
that jurisdiction confers on a court the ability to bind the parties 
before it and thus that the preclusive consequences of a decision in 
the absence of verified subject matter jurisdiction should be quite 
limited.  Despite capturing an intuitive and visceral concern about 
judicial power, that premise is flawed and undercuts the theory. 
What I term the present litigant theory derives from 
scholarship by Michael J. Edney and Kevin Clermont.  Edney 
argues that subject matter jurisdiction, as a protection of 
federalism, “is the power of federal courts to issue determinations 
of law and fact preclusive in state court.”140  In light of those 
concerns, Edney calls for special preclusion rules when a federal 
court, before establishing subject matter jurisdiction, dismisses a 
case on a threshold issue.  He argues that parties should not be 
precluded from relitigating that issue in state court.141 
Clermont similarly has suggested that the key to understanding 
jurisdictional sequencing lies in preclusion rules.142  But he argues 
that a dismissal on a threshold ground in the absence of verified 
subject matter jurisdiction should be entitled to at least some 
degree of preclusion in state court.143  The more nuanced approach 
that he envisions stems from a first principle of subject matter 
                                                                                                                   
 138 Issue preclusion prevents a party from relitigating an issue that was “actually litigated 
and determined” and was essential to the outcome of the first action.  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).  Furthermore, the party against whom issue 
preclusion is sought must have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the earlier 
litigation.  Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979). 
 139 Claim preclusion prevents a plaintiff from raising unlitigated matters that were part of 
the same transaction underlying an earlier lawsuit.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982). 
 140 Edney, supra note 9, at 216 (emphasis added); see also id. at 208 (arguing that subject 
matter jurisdiction vindicates “the interests of state courts in autonomous adjudication” of 
cases). 
 141 See id. at 221. 
 142 Clermont’s analysis relies, at different points, on the concepts of both issue preclusion 
and claim preclusion.  Clermont, supra note 6, at 316–30. 
 143 Id. at 323; see also id. at 323–24 (arguing that allowing an unfettered right to relitigate 
in state court undermines efficiency). 
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jurisdiction (that a federal court always has jurisdiction to 
determine its own jurisdiction)144 and a corollary of that principle 
(that a court also has jurisdiction to determine that it lacks 
jurisdiction).145  Even a court’s determination that it lacks 
jurisdiction, Clermont maintains, is entitled to some limited 
preclusive effect; specifically, a party may not relitigate the precise 
jurisdictional question in another court.146  Clermont extrapolates 
that a dismissal on a threshold ground, before a court has 
established subject matter jurisdiction, should enjoy the same 
limited issue preclusive effect that attaches to a court’s 
determination that it lacks jurisdiction.147 
1.  Descriptive Deficiencies.  Like the other theories considered 
in this Part, the present litigant theory lacks full explanatory 
power.  Although the theory has the virtue of explaining the 
outcome of the jurisdictional-sequencing trilogy, it undermines the 
Supreme Court’s more expansive view of the preclusive 
consequences that attach to threshold dismissals. 
Ruhrgas recognized that a dismissal for lack of personal 
jurisdiction might “preclude the parties from relitigating the very 
same personal jurisdiction issue in state court.”148  In elucidating 
that concept, the Court borrowed an example offered at oral 
argument by the late Charles Alan Wright, Ruhrgas’s lawyer, that 
envisions a much broader preclusive effect for jurisdictional and 
other threshold dismissals.149  The Court hypothesized a state-law 
cause of action that a defendant removes to federal court in which 
a plaintiff seeks $50,000 in compensatory damages and $1 million 
in punitive damages.150  If the federal court determines that 
                                                                                                                   
 144 See id. at 316–18 (describing the doctrine); Dodson, supra note 3, at 1453–54 (same); 
see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 367–68 (1993) (same). 
 145 Clermont, supra note 6, at 318–20. 
 146 See id. (arguing that the question whether a court has jurisdiction may not be 
relitigated but any underlying issues decided in the course of assessing jurisdiction may be 
relitigated). 
 147 Id. at 325. 
 148 Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999). 
 149 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8–9, Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 574 (No. 98-470), 1999 WL 
183813, at *8–9. 
 150 Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 149, at 8–9. 
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punitive damages are not available under state law and remands 
the case because it fails to satisfy the amount-in-controversy 
requirement, the determination about the unavailability of 
punitive damages under state law could be preclusive.151  That is, 
the Court suggested that preclusion might attach to far more than 
the single fact that jurisdiction was lacking.  Rather, all issues 
decided in the course of a jurisdictional dismissal could be 
precluded and thus prevent parties from relitigating certain 
questions that pertain both to the federal court’s jurisdiction as 
well as to the case’s underlying merits.152 
The present litigant theory thus is at odds with the Supreme 
Court’s vision of how preclusion and jurisdictional sequencing 
interact.  Specifically, Ruhrgas rejected the theory’s asserted 
parallelism between subject matter jurisdiction and the power to 
bind litigants in other courts.  According to some scholars, the 
theory’s apparent descriptive deficiency is unproblematic because 
the Ruhrgas dictum on preclusion is simply a misstatement of the 
law.  Clermont, for example, chastises the Court for “just 
swallow[ing Professor Wright’s] example whole” and “provid[ing] 
completely irrelevant support” for its assertions about the 
preclusive effects of threshold dismissals.153  He and Idleman 
insist that jurisdictional dismissals do not enjoy the wide 
preclusive effects that Wright and the Court posited.154 
Contrary to the arguments by Clermont and Idleman, the Court 
might have been right.  Although the law is not settled on exactly 
what preclusive consequences attach to jurisdictional dismissals, 
federal courts frequently have given preclusive effect to underlying 
issues decided in the course of such dismissals.  Those decisions 
                                                                                                                   
 151 Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585–86.  
 152 The point is not just a theoretical nicety.  Federal courts tend to take a somewhat more 
restrictive view of personal jurisdiction questions than do state courts.  Michael E. 
Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1, 51–53 (1998).  
Consequently, an opportunity to relitigate the issue in state court might yield a different 
outcome. 
 153 Clermont, supra note 6, at 324–25. 
 154 See id. (“[Justice Ginsburg’s] result . . . is wrong.”); Idleman, supra note 1, at 29–30 
(arguing that law of the case, not preclusion, governs a federal court’s jurisdictional 
dismissal and that Ruhrgas “appears to have stated at best a novel legal theory and at 
worst a basic legal error”). 
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both postdate155 and predate156 the Ruhrgas decision, thus belying 
Clermont’s suggestion that Ruhrgas itself spawned an 
unwarranted expansion of issue preclusion.157  The broader vision 
of preclusion that Wright advocated at oral argument in Ruhrgas, 
and that the Court accepted, is one to which his treatise on federal 
jurisdiction long had adhered.158  Moreover, the Supreme Court 
itself has the power to craft preclusion principles for federal 
judgments,159 thus lending credence to the appropriateness of the 
Ruhrgas dictum. 
In short, there are good reasons to believe that the Court’s more 
expansive view of preclusion, decoupled from subject matter 
jurisdiction, correctly articulates the law.  If that is so, then the 
present litigant theory cannot fully explain an underlying tenet of 
the jurisdictional-sequencing case law.  This conclusion is more 
tentative than the conspicuous normative criticisms of the present 
litigant theory, discussed immediately below.  But it suggests that, 
despite a certain intuitive attractiveness, the present litigant 
theory fails both descriptively and normatively. 
                                                                                                                   
 155 See, e.g., Grudzinski v. Staren, 87 F. App’x 508, 510–12 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
the state court’s jurisdictional dismissal decided that plaintiff’s contract was for one year 
and that issue preclusion prevented relitigation of the contract’s duration); Matosantos 
Comm. Corp. v. Applebee’s Int’l, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1109–10 (D. Kan. 1999) (holding 
that issue preclusion attached to another federal court’s determination, in dismissing for 
lack of jurisdiction, that defendant assumed a purchase agreement with plaintiff), aff’d by 
245 F.3d 1203, 1210 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that “[a]lthough uncommon, it is not legally 
significant that the issue foreclosed in the present case goes to the merits of [plaintiff’s] 
claim rather than the jurisdiction of the . . . district court”). 
 156 See, e.g., Unity House, Inc. v. First Comm. Fin. Grp., No. 98-1060, 1999 WL 164924, at 
*1–2 (7th Cir. Mar. 17, 1999) (holding that issue preclusion attached to a determination of 
agency made by another court in the course of a jurisdictional ruling); Oglala Sioux Tribe of 
Pine Ridge Indian Reservation v. Homestake Mining Co., 722 F.2d 1407, 1412 (8th Cir. 
1983) (holding that the constitutionality of a statute had been determined in an earlier 
proceeding that dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and could not be 
relitigated); Roth v. McAllister Bros., 316 F.2d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that 
defendant was precluded from relitigating a question of employment that another tribunal 
had decided when dismissing for lack of jurisdiction). 
 157 See Clermont, supra note 6, at 324 (arguing that the Ruhrgas dictum had created “the 
danger . . . that courts will give too much preclusive effect”). 
 158 See 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4436, at 
154 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that “a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction . . . does preclude 
relitigation of the issues determined in ruling on the jurisdiction question”). 
 159 Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507 (2001). 
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2.  Normative Deficiencies.  At first blush, there is an appealing 
symmetry to viewing jurisdictional sequencing through the lens of 
preclusion principles.  After all, the Supreme Court in Ruhrgas 
and Sinochem made clear that subject matter jurisdiction is 
essential only if a court presumes to reach the merits of a case.160  
By the same token, the claim preclusive effect of a dismissal in 
federal court largely turns on whether there has been, in the 
language of the Federal Rules, “an adjudication on the merits.”161  
Along those lines, Clermont argues that jurisdictional sequencing 
should mirror “the line that [claim preclusion] already draws—
with fair clarity—when it declines to create a bar to reassertion of 
the claim after an adjudication ‘not on the merits.’ ”162 
The normative difficulty with the present litigant theory is that 
it conflates two conceptually distinct ideas—the substance of a 
lawsuit and preclusion—and thereby treats subject matter 
jurisdiction as a personal right or privilege rather than a 
structural limitation on judicial power.163  As scholars and courts 
have recognized, the apparent symmetry between the substantive 
merits and preclusion is a siren song.  The merits–nonmerits line, 
for purposes of the jurisdictional-sequencing cases, relates to the 
conduct rules that are at the heart of a cause of action.164  By 
contrast, the term “on the merits,” as used to describe when 
preclusion attaches to certain dismissals, “is an unfortunate 
phrase”165 that has a vastly different meaning and “has become so 
                                                                                                                   
 160 Sinochem, 549 U.S. 422, 431–33 (2007); Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 574, 584–85 (1999). 
 161 FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(B), (b) (emphasis added). 
 162 Clermont, supra note 6, at 329. 
 163 This portion of Clermont’s theory rests more on notions of claim preclusion rather than 
issue preclusion.  His analysis elides the distinction between the two, even though they 
operate differently.  Because the preclusion analogy fails for other reasons, I don’t discuss 
whether this imprecision is problematic for his theory. 
 164 See Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, 101–02 (1998) (“For a court to pronounce upon the meaning 
or the constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by 
very definition, for a court to act ultra vires.”); Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 583 (similarly 
recognizing subject matter jurisdiction as essential for an adjudication of the substantive 
merits); cf. 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 158, § 4435, at 134 (noting that preclusion may 
attach to a “judgment that does not rest on any examination whatever of the substantive 
rights asserted”). 
 165 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 158, § 4435, at 132–33 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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misleading as to be less than worthless.”166  “The characteristics 
that determine the extent of preclusion may have little to do with 
actual resolution of the merits . . . .”167  In a similar vein, the 
Supreme Court has observed that the phrase “on the merits” might 
“appl[y] to some judgments . . . that do not pass upon the 
substantive merits of a claim.”168  And even Clermont 
acknowledges that certain dismissals to which preclusion attaches 
“are perhaps not in any real sense on the merits.”169 
This is not a situation in which one legal doctrine can borrow 
concepts developed in another context,170 precisely because subject 
matter jurisdiction and preclusion rules are based on, and protect, 
different policies.  The bounds of jurisdictional sequencing derive 
from a proper understanding of subject matter jurisdiction as a 
structural limitation on courts rather than a personal right or 
privilege.  Subject matter jurisdiction protects separation of 
powers and federalism concerns, particularly the power of the 
political branches and states to create conduct rules.  Individual 
litigants may raise an objection to a defect in subject matter 
jurisdiction in order to assist courts in policing that structural 
boundary, but litigants have no personal liberty interest in subject 
matter jurisdiction.  By contrast, preclusion rests mainly on 
                                                                                                                   
 166 DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 34 (2001). 
 167 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 158, § 4435, at 133–34; see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 cmt. a (1982) (noting that the Restatement avoids the phrase 
“on the merits” in order to avoid “possibly misleading connotations” since “judgments not 
passing directly on the substance of the claim” often have preclusive effects). 
 168 Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 502 (2001).  Semtek 
narrowed the phrase even further, holding that an “adjudication on the merits” simply 
denotes a dismissal with prejudice and does not necessarily have claim preclusive effects.  
Id. at 505–06. 
 169 Clermont, supra note 6, at 329 n.140 (quoting ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. 
CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 98–99 
(2001)).  Some of the dismissals that he includes in that description are dismissals for 
failure to state a claim and on summary judgment.  See id.  Arguably those dismissals 
implicate the underlying merits of a case.  By contrast, dismissals for failure to prosecute or 
obey a court order, though preclusive, have nothing to do with the substance of the claim. 
Clermont’s attempt to distinguish such dismissals is unclear.  See id. at 329 n.141. 
 170 Cf. Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 
469 (2010) (endorsing borrowing generally but cautioning that “[n]ot every legal idea is 
compatible with another—the relationships may not be intuitive, the union may seem 
forced, and the result may be a jumble”). 
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policies of preserving individuals’ personal interests in having a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate (and in repose once litigation 
has concluded).171 
The present litigant theory blurs the critical distinction 
between structural limitations and personal liberty interests, as 
Clermont’s examples make clear.  He envisions that jurisdictional 
sequencing should permit courts to dismiss cases based on lack of 
jurisdiction, improper venue, certain voluntary dismissals, and 
certain problems with party joinder.172  Indeed, many courts have 
recognized that such dismissals may precede a determination of 
subject matter jurisdiction.173  But Clermont argues that 
dismissals based on sovereign immunity, which some courts have 
permitted even before they decide subject matter jurisdiction,174 
are impermissible.175  Thus, according to his theory, jurisdictional 
sequencing should permit only those dismissals that “allow[ ] the 
plaintiff to correct the threshold defect in a second suit.”176 
In short, the present litigant theory treats subject matter 
jurisdiction as a matter of personal liberty and views jurisdictional 
sequencing through that lens.  That premise is fundamentally 
flawed, though, because subject matter jurisdiction is exclusively a 
structural limitation on courts’ power vis-à-vis the political 
branches and states. 
                                                                                                                   
 171 Preclusion also implicates courts’ institutional interest in efficiency because it prevents 
the relitigation of certain questions.  But that institutional interest in conserving resources 
is quite different than the structural interests in separation of powers and federalism that 
undergird subject matter jurisdiction. 
 172 See Clermont, supra note 6, at 329 n.140.  That list largely tracks the dismissals that 
the Federal Rules regard as not being “on the merits” and to which no preclusive effect 
attaches.  FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a), (b); see also CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 169, at 98–99; 
18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 158, § 4435, at 135–38 (discussing voluntary dismissals). 
 173 See, e.g., supra note 56 (venue); Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 574, 578 (1999) (personal 
jurisdiction). 
 174 E.g., Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999); In re 
Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 175 See Clermont, supra note 6, at 330 (“[D]isputed matters of sovereign 
immunity . . . should not be resquensceable . . . .”). 
 176 Clermont, supra note 6, at 328–30; see also Hernandez v. Conriv Realty Assocs., 182 
F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that “where a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it 
also lacks the power to dismiss with prejudice”). 
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IV.  CONDUCT RULES AND ALLOCATIVE RULES 
In this Part, I develop a theory of jurisdictional sequencing 
predicated on the distinction between conduct rules and allocative 
rules.  According to this theory, threshold dismissals that are 
based on allocative rules are permissible even before a federal 
court has verified its subject matter jurisdiction.  The theory is the 
first to resolve the low-level problem of reconciling the case law.  
Unlike the theories discussed in Part III, it also addresses the 
overarching normative question about what precisely subject 
matter jurisdiction protects and grounds jurisdictional sequencing 
in the answer to that question. 
On a more conceptual level, this Part offers a reimagining of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  While unconventional, it finds support 
in historical notions of jurisdiction as a structural constraint that 
only recently has acquired the patina of absoluteness.  I explore 
the ways that this new vision of subject matter jurisdiction 
provides a robust way to understand broader problems that 
scholars and courts have identified and only recently have begun 
to systematize.  In particular, the theory developed here suggests a 
way to understand jurisdiction’s malleability as well as the fluidity 
of jurisdictional, threshold, and merits concepts.  Such fluidity has 
become increasingly salient, especially in the class action context. 
A.  A NEW THEORY OF JURISDICTIONAL SEQUENCING 
The key to understanding the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional 
sequencing jurisprudence lies in differentiating between conduct 
rules and allocative rules.  A conduct rule refers to a rule that 
governs primary obligations, rights, and prohibitions.  Most often 
it is an element of a cause of action or a defense that responds 
directly to one of those elements.  As I elaborate later, the inquiry 
is not whether a particular rule has an impact on rights and 
obligations; virtually any rule will.177  Rather, the question usually 
                                                                                                                   
 177 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (noting that “every procedural 
variation” can affect a case’s outcome); Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in 
the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 69 (1998) (“[E]ven the 
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is whether a rule, judged from an ex ante perspective, will tend to 
affect how individuals understand their rights and obligations and, 
accordingly, whether that rule affects how individuals shape their 
primary conduct.178 
By contrast, allocative rules govern the allocation of decision-
making authority.  They answer two questions: who decides, and 
how?  Allocative rules concern the jurisdictional rules that confer 
and withhold decisional authority.  They also include rules that 
are administrative or procedural in nature, the mechanisms by 
which decisionmakers interpret and apply conduct rules. 
According to this view, a federal court has an absolute 
obligation to verify its subject matter jurisdiction only when it 
adjudicates (and thus creates) a conduct rule.  Such adjudication 
includes interpreting a conduct rule—whether from a 
constitutional, statutory, or regulatory source—and also applying 
that rule to the specific facts of a case.  In elucidating a conduct 
rule, through purely legal interpretations or application of law to 
fact, a court exercises its substantive “law-declaring” authority 
and makes law, at least at the margins, by refining, clarifying, and 
giving greater content to conduct rules.179  That is true regardless 
of whether a court declares law in the formal sense by creating 
binding precedent or in a more informal fashion.180  Either way, a 
court’s exposition of a conduct rule, from an ex ante perspective, 
informs individuals about the nature of their rights and 
obligations and thereby influences decisions about their primary 
                                                                                                                   
most ostensibly innocuous rule . . . will have some impact on substantive rights. . . .”). 
 178 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 
1128 (1982) (describing rules that “affect out-of-court conduct”); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474–76 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (noting the preeminence of rules that govern primary activity); 
Kramer v. Gates, 481 F.3d 788, 791 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (arguing that law-declaring power 
concerns rules with an “effect on primary conduct”).  This formulation for assessing a 
conduct rule is a rule of thumb and, at the margins, probably is overinclusive.  Certain rules 
that I regard as allocative rules, such as immunity, might have an impact on primary 
conduct from an ex ante perspective.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 179 See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 883 (2006) 
(noting the Holmesian precept that common law adjudication involves the creation of law). 
 180 Cf. Richard D. Freer, Observations on the Scope of the Supreme Court’s Rejection of 
“Hypothetical Jurisdiction,” 8 FED. LITIG. GUIDE RPTR. 247, 250 (Oct. 1999) (noting the 
possibility of reading the jurisdictional-sequencing cases to permit any adjudication that 
“does not require a precedential holding” (emphasis added)). 
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conduct.181  In that meaningful but limited way a court makes law, 
and the ability to make law through the adjudication of conduct 
rules is at the heart of what subject matter jurisdiction protects.  
That view of subject matter jurisdiction is not concerned with a 
court’s ability to bind the litigants in a pending case.  Instead, it 
focuses on a court’s authority to create conduct rules that will 
affect individuals’ future conduct and provide rules of decision for 
future cases.182 
While subject matter jurisdiction does enjoy pride of place in 
the sequencing hierarchy when a federal court adjudicates a 
conduct rule, the converse also is true: a court does not have to 
verify subject matter jurisdiction when it dismisses a case based 
on an allocative rule.  This understanding best captures the 
dichotomy in the jurisdictional-sequencing cases of “merits” 
dismissals, for which subject matter jurisdiction is required, 
versus “nonmerits threshold” dismissals, for which jurisdiction is 
not essential.  An allocative rule governs access to courts, typically 
implicates procedural and administrative concerns, and thus does 
not risk creating conduct rules.  While any dismissal creates law in 
some sense (for instance, a dismissal for lack of standing yields 
another data point in the law of standing), a dismissal based on an 
allocative rule does not define rights or obligations, nor from an ex 
                                                                                                                   
 181 A district court, for instance, never creates binding precedent, but someone trying to 
understand how courts will interpret certain provisions of law will heed a district court’s 
pronouncements.  Similarly, a federal court’s interpretation of state substantive law, though 
not binding, is a relevant data point for anyone interested in figuring out how a court might 
apply that law. 
 182 What some might regard as an insensitivity to the actual litigants before a court is 
actually at the core of how courts usually understand judicial lawmaking.  Even when 
courts change the rules of the game in a given case, such as by overruling precedents, the 
new rule usually applies to the pending case rather than on a prospective basis only.  See 
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“[J]udges in a real sense ‘make’ law.  But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as 
though they were ‘finding’ it—discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing what it is 
today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.  Of course this mode of action poses 
‘difficulties of a . . . practical sort’ when courts decide to overrule prior precedent.  But those 
difficulties are one of the understood checks upon judicial law making; to eliminate them is 
to render courts substantially more free to ‘make new law,’ and thus to alter in a 
fundamental way the assigned balance of responsibility and power among the three 
branches.” (citation omitted)). 
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ante perspective does it alter how individuals understand such 
rights and obligations under the law.183 
The dichotomy that I suggest might be redolent of the classic 
distinction between substance and procedure and, indeed, certain 
comparisons are conceptually helpful.  For instance, the Erie184 
doctrine generally requires federal courts sitting in diversity to 
apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.185  Most 
modern constitutional defenses of Erie rest on a separation of 
powers notion that is consonant with my analysis here.  
Specifically, many scholars defend Erie on the ground that 
Congress has a unique ability to create truly substantive law—
conduct rules—and that courts may not exercise such power 
without congressional authorization.186 
Despite these parallels, I don’t rely on the substance–procedure 
nomenclature for several reasons.  First, the distinction between 
substance and procedure does not capture a single, inherent legal 
idea.  Instead, what brands a rule as substantive or procedural 
often depends on context and the specific policy goals that the 
differentiation seeks to effectuate.187  Second, within the Erie line 
                                                                                                                   
 183 Defining a conduct rule in terms of its regulation of primary conduct is not a resort to 
the modified “outcome-determinative” test of Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).  A 
conduct rule governs the ordering of one’s daily activities and decisions, whereas the 
modified “outcome-determinative” test turns specifically on whether a rule likely will induce 
forum-shopping.  See id. at 468–69.  Moreover, even though Justice Harlan’s concurrence 
invoked “primary activity” as a means of drawing the substance–procedure distinction, see 
id. at 474 (Harlan, J., concurring), it actually relied on a state enclave theory of federal 
power that has fallen into disrepute.  See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 693, 700–06 (1974) (“[T]he enclave theory does not accurately reflect the 
Constitution’s plan for allocating power between the federal and state governments.”). 
 184 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 185 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). 
 186 See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words On Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. L. 
REV. 1682, 1683 (1974); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: 
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1975); Martin H. Redish, Federal 
Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An “Institutionalist” 
Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 766–67, 801 (1989).  
 187 See generally Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of 
Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933); see also Kelleher, supra note 177, at 109 (“The phrase 
‘substantive rights,’ as used in the [Rules Enabling Act], does not have the same meaning as 
in other areas of legal discourse.  Some matters that in ordinary legal parlance are 
considered ‘procedural,’ such as venue or subject matter jurisdiction, are ‘substantive’ for 
purposes of the REA.”). 
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of cases, the substance–procedure distinction has acquired unique, 
even idiosyncratic, meanings that are unhelpful for present 
purposes.  Leaving aside pervasive scholarly debates about the 
correctness and foundations of Erie,188 John Hart Ely has observed 
that the Erie doctrine is not actually a unified doctrine but instead 
a conglomeration of cases that courts decide on the basis of very 
different governing principles.189  Consequently, the outcome of an 
Erie case often has little bearing on whether a particular question 
of law actually regulates substantive rights and obligations.190  
Third, I define an allocative rule as far broader than almost any 
working definition of a procedural rule.  Finally, in the context of 
criminal law, Meier Dan–Cohen has explored a concept that is 
similar to the dichotomy between conduct rules and allocative 
rules.  His conceptualization is particularly apt for the present 
analysis, and I rely in part on his terminology.191 
B.  SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AS A STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINT 
The search for a coherent theory of jurisdictional sequencing 
ultimately is rooted in the endeavor to understand what exactly 
subject matter jurisdiction protects and what courts may not do in 
its absence.  Meaningful answers to those questions should drive 
the conceptualization of jurisdictional sequencing.  Unfortunately, 
most scholarly and judicial treatments of jurisdictional sequencing 
have not engaged those questions at all or, at most, have offered 
imprecise appeals to separation of powers and federalism.  The 
                                                                                                                   
 188 See generally Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289 
(2007); Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (2008); Suzanna Sherry, 
Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 
129 (2012). 
 189 See Ely, supra note 183, at 697–700 (arguing that three different rules of decision 
govern the choice of federal versus state law in diversity cases—the Constitution, the Rules 
of Decision Act, and the Rules Enabling Act). 
 190 For instance, in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., the Supreme Court 
determined that state tolling rules should govern (and thus in a sense were “substantive” 
for Erie purposes).  See 333 U.S. 530, 533–34 (1949).  But it would strain credulity to say 
that such rules are “substantive” in any typical use of that word. 
 191 See Dan–Cohen, supra note 12.  I borrow his term “conduct rules” but refer to the other 
part of the dichotomy as “allocative rules” in order to convey better how these concepts 
apply in the civil realm, particularly to antecedent jurisdictional questions. 
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better and more complete understanding of subject matter 
jurisdiction is that it serves as a limited institutional restraint. 
Subject matter jurisdiction is not a talisman without which 
courts literally have no power to act, nor is it a personal right or 
privilege.  Instead, it is a narrow structural constraint that 
prevents courts from impinging on the preeminent power of the 
political branches and states—the power to create and define 
primary rights and obligations.  For that reason, subject matter 
jurisdiction is vital only when a federal court adjudicates a conduct 
rule and thereby creates law that might affect individuals’ future 
behavior.  Grounding jurisdictional sequencing in that specific 
vision of subject matter jurisdiction’s unique, but limited, role 
vindicates important constitutional values.  At the same time, 
such an approach does not unnecessarily prevent courts from 
resolving cases more efficiently when those structural values are 
not at stake. 
Courts and scholars consistently have recognized that subject 
matter jurisdiction is a structural limitation that protects 
institutional interests and “keep[s] the federal courts within the 
bounds the Constitution and Congress have prescribed.”192  Subject 
matter jurisdiction primarily serves separation of powers 
interests,193 and it also vindicates certain federalism principles.194  
As a structural constraint, it protects particular interests of the 
political branches and states, but those interests are not 
necessarily implicated whenever a federal court acts.  To take a 
pedestrian example mentioned earlier, a court that performs 
                                                                                                                   
 192 Ruhrgas, 529 U.S. 574, 583 (1999); see also id. (noting that “[s]ubject-matter 
limitations on federal jurisdiction serve institutional interests”); Idleman, supra note 1, at 
31–32 (noting that “[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction requirements are structural in nature”); 
Jason Wojciechowski, Federalism Limits on Article III Jurisdiction, 88 NEB. L. REV. 288, 
305–06 (2009) (noting the “subjugation of personal rights to structural concerns” in the 
subject matter jurisdiction context); Stephen I. Vladeck, Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas 
Corpus, Citizenship, and Article III, 95 GEO. L.J. 1497, 1541–43 (2007) (discussing subject 
matter jurisdiction as a structural limitation rather than an individual right). 
 193 E.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998); see Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 512–14 
(1868) (noting the necessity of respecting congressional withdrawal of subject matter 
jurisdiction). 
 194 See, e.g., Edney, supra note 9, at 208–11 (discussing the federalism implications of 
“federal courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction”). 
1142 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 47:1099 
 
 
routine docket-management functions, such as assigning a docket 
number and scheduling a hearing, has not usurped any cognizable 
power or interest.  Instead, a proper understanding of subject 
matter jurisdiction should focus on what kinds of judicial actions 
are most likely to compromise institutional interests. 
Courts and Congress have embraced the proposition that 
crafting conduct rules is the preeminent power and the one that 
deserves the most rigorous protection.  That idea, while often 
inchoate and ill-defined, has animated some of the most significant 
conceptions of federal–state relations.  For instance, the Erie 
doctrine concerns the fundamental question of which sovereign 
has the power to declare substantive law (and when that law 
applies).195  Relatedly, when Congress empowered the Supreme 
Court to promulgate rules of procedure for federal courts, it 
emphasized that “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify 
any substantive right.”196  Navigating the often hazy line between 
substance and procedure can be difficult197 and yield inconsistent 
(and even incoherent) results.198  For that reason, the theory that I 
develop here does not necessarily track current conceptions of the 
substance–procedure dichotomy.  Nonetheless, Congress’s 
distinction of substantive and procedural rules expresses the 
conviction that the line, however elusive, captures an important 
separation of powers notion.  In particular, Congress sought to 
protect its ability to create positive law.  Furthermore, cabining 
federal courts’ authority to intrude upon that congressional power 
had the salutary effect of protecting federalism interests.199  
Conspicuously absent from these notions of institutional power, 
                                                                                                                   
 195 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  Despite persistent criticism of Erie, the 
fact remains that Erie and its critics still recognize that determining conduct rules is the 
preeminent power.  See generally Green, supra note 188; Sherry, supra note 188. 
 196 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 197 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551–52 (2011) (discussing 
the potential overlap of merits and class certification questions). 
 198 See generally Alan M. Trammell, Toil and Trouble: How the Erie Doctrine Became 
Structurally Incoherent (and How Congress Can Fix It), 82 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014) (on file with author). 
 199 See Burbank, supra note 178, at 1106–14 (noting that “the protection of state law was 
deemed a probable effect” of the Rules Enabling Act’s allocation of “lawmaking power 
between federal institutions”). 
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though, is any indication that individual litigants have a personal 
liberty interest in Congress’s allocation of law-making authority. 
The conclusion that subject matter jurisdiction is a narrow 
structural limitation on federal courts’ power to craft conduct rules 
provides a theoretical framework for understanding jurisdictional 
sequencing.  When a court dismisses a case based on an allocative 
rule and declines to adjudicate a conduct rule, even to a party’s 
chagrin, the institutional interests in separation of powers and, to 
a lesser extent, federalism are not implicated.200  Dismissals on the 
basis of an allocative rule do not arrogate new powers to the 
federal courts.  To the contrary, those rules are an attempt to 
confine federal courts’ exercise of judicial authority to the bounds 
established by the Constitution and Congress.  Thus, they do not 
run afoul of the underlying structural purposes of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
A traditionalist undoubtedly would object to this vision of 
subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that a court acts 
illegitimately and has no authority to affect or bind the litigants in 
any way unless it has concluded that it has jurisdiction.201  
Although I have offered a reimagining of subject matter 
jurisdiction’s precise structural role, that conceptualization, while 
unorthodox, is not revolutionary.  The basic tenets of the narrow 
structural view that I propose have animated the jurisdictional 
discourse for more than a century, even if most courts have not 
explicitly embraced the conclusions that I draw. 
                                                                                                                   
 200 See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 574, 584–85 (1999) (noting that a “court that dismisses 
on . . . non-merits grounds . . . makes no assumption of law-declaring power that violates 
the separation of powers principles underlying Mansfield and Steel Company” (quoting In re 
Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1998)) (first alteration in original) (internal 
quotation mark omitted)). 
 201 See, e.g., Idleman, supra note 1, at 32–33; Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: 
Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal 
Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 22 (1981); see also Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, 
Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1547–48 (2008) 
(describing subject matter jurisdiction as a “court’s raw, baseline power and legitimate 
authority to hear and resolve the legal and factual issues in a class of cases”); cf. Evan Tsen 
Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1613–15 (2003) 
(articulating but criticizing the traditional concept of subject matter jurisdiction).  
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One of the standard citations for subject matter jurisdiction’s 
absolute essentiality, as well as a party’s ability to raise an 
objection to jurisdictional defects whenever a case is pending, is 
the nineteenth-century case of Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake 
Michigan Railway Co. v. Swan.202  The defendants in Mansfield 
removed the case to federal court, lost on the merits at trial, and 
then complained that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction.203  In 
almost every other situation, the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
would prevent a party from making one argument to a trial court 
and then the exact opposite argument to an appellate court.204  But 
subject matter jurisdiction is different.  Despite the Mansfield 
defendants’ chutzpah in complaining about the jurisdiction of the 
court to which they removed the case, the Supreme Court noted 
that the requirement of subject matter jurisdiction was “inflexible 
and without exception” and vacated the judgment.205 
The flipside of Mansfield is equally instructive.  Although a 
court has an obligation to protect the interests served by subject 
matter jurisdiction, even in the face of a party’s (mis)behavior, 
there is no reason to allow parties to assert a personal interest in 
subject matter jurisdiction when institutional interests are not at 
stake.  Otherwise, Mansfield would acquire something of a “heads 
I win, tails you lose” aura.  In many instances, parties’ interests 
and those of the court overlap.  To the extent that parties are able 
to assist courts in guarding institutional interests, a liberal policy 
permits parties to make jurisdictional objections.206  But subject 
                                                                                                                   
 202 111 U.S. 379 (1884); see also Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998); Michael G. Collins, 
Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1829, 1868–70 (2007); Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond 
Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 
MINN. L. REV. 491, 491–92 (1966). 
 203 See 111 U.S. at 381–82. 
 204 See 18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 158, § 4477, at 549 (noting that “judicial estoppel” 
prevents a party from asserting “[i]nconsistent positions in successive litigation”); see also 
Gray v. City of Valley Park, 567 F.3d 976, 982 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that “this is just the 
sort of case to which judicial estoppel must apply” but declining to apply estoppel because of 
the court’s independent duty to ensure Article III jurisdiction). 
 205 Mansfield, 111 U.S. at 382; accord id. at 389. 
 206 See id. at 382 (describing subject matter jurisdiction as implicating only institutional 
concerns); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction the court must dismiss the action.”). 
2013] JURISDICTIONAL SEQUENCING 1145 
 
 
matter jurisdiction is not a personal right or privilege, as 
demonstrated by the parties’ inability to consent to subject matter 
jurisdiction and courts’ independent obligation to address 
jurisdictional defects.207  When institutional interests are not at 
stake, parties should not be able to convert subject matter 
jurisdiction into a personal privilege.208 
At least one court has moved toward a more explicit recognition 
of the limited structural role that subject matter jurisdiction plays 
and has done so in the context of jurisdictional sequencing.  In 
Kramer v. Gates, the D.C. Circuit pretermitted a decision on a 
complicated jurisdictional question and dismissed the case for not 
having met the requirements for relief from final judgment under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).209  The court noted that it 
did not regard “an interpretation of the limits of Rule 
60(b)(6) . . . as an exercise of a court’s law-declaring power as Steel 
Company used the concept, as the scope of Rule 60(b)(6) is far 
removed from any effect on primary conduct.”210  The court thus 
suggested that subject matter jurisdiction, while necessary to 
adjudicate a conduct rule that governs primary behavior, is not 
essential to resolve an allocative rule, such as Rule 60(b)(6).  That 
approach corresponds with the more limited conceptualization of 
subject matter jurisdiction’s precise role in regulating only certain 
kinds of judicial actions. 
Further bolstering the vision of subject matter jurisdiction that 
I have proffered here is the fact that the traditional view of 
jurisdiction as a court’s legitimate power to act never has been 
completely true.  For starters, the idea of jurisdictional 
exceptionalism—including federal courts’ duty to ensure the actual 
existence of subject matter jurisdiction and to dismiss 
jurisdictionally defective cases—is of relatively recent vintage, 
dating only to the 1930s.211  For much of American history, parties 
could consent to subject matter jurisdiction and forfeit 
                                                                                                                   
 207 Ruhrgas, 529 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). 
 208 See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text. 
 209 See 481 F.3d 788, 790–91 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 210 Id. at 791. 
 211 Collins, supra note 202, at 1873. 
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jurisdictional objections.212  Moreover, even though courts used to 
regard a judgment in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction as 
invalid, such that it was always subject to attack, the modern 
approach to preclusion has been far less dogmatic.  Since at least 
the 1930s, preclusion principles have placed a greater premium on 
according finality to judgments.213  Consequently, once a question 
of subject matter jurisdiction has been litigated and determined 
(even incorrectly), a judgment almost always is immune from a 
jurisdictional attack.214  The same is true when a jurisdictional 
defect comes to light belatedly.215 
Notwithstanding these arguments, some people still might be 
disturbed that a federal court, before verifying its subject matter 
jurisdiction, could render a decision that conclusively binds the 
parties.  Efforts to address that concern, though, should not 
involve tinkering with a proper understanding of jurisdiction.  The 
Ruhrgas Court correctly recognized that subject matter 
jurisdiction, a structural constraint, is conceptually distinct from 
preclusion principles, which largely protect litigants’ personal 
liberty interests.216  Any residual concerns about litigants’ rights 
thus pertain to preclusion, not jurisdiction.  Indeed, Congress, or 
the Supreme Court on its own initiative, can create or alter rules 
of preclusion for federal judicial determinations.217  As a 
prudential matter, it is perfectly logical to recognize a broad power 
                                                                                                                   
 212 See id. at 1841 (forfeiture); id. at 1847–49 (consent). 
 213 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 cmt. a (1982); see also Stoll v. Gottlieb, 
305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938) (“It is just as important that there should be a place to end as that 
there should be a place to begin litigation.”); Bennet Boskey & Robert Braucher, 
Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack: October Term, 1939, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 1006, 1006–12 
(1940) (discussing the Supreme Court’s evolution toward a principle of finality as to 
jurisdictional determinations). 
 214 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 & cmt. b (1982) (articulating the 
general rule and the few exceptions that allow for relitigating subject matter jurisdiction). 
 215 See Des Moines Navigation & R.R. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U.S. 522, 559 (1887) 
(indulging the fiction that jurisdiction had been “impliedly recognized”). 
 216 Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 574, 585–86 (1999) (noting that a threshold dismissal, even in the 
absence of verified subject matter jurisdiction, could preclude a party from relitigating 
issues decided in the course of that dismissal). 
 217 Edney, supra note 9, at 202–06; see also Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 
531 U.S. 497, 507 (2001) (intimating that Congress could create preclusion rules for federal 
courts sitting in diversity). 
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of jurisdictional sequencing but also to deny preclusive effect to 
judicial determinations unless a federal court has expressly 
established its subject matter jurisdiction.218  The upshot is that 
courts and scholars should resist the temptation to conflate the 
structural limitations of subject matter jurisdiction and any 
additional prudential constraints that might be desirable. 
C.  ALLOCATIVE RULES AS EXPLANATORY OF JURISDICTIONAL 
SEQUENCING 
Unlike any of the theories considered in Part III, a theory of 
jurisdictional sequencing based on the notion of allocative rules 
fully explains and reconciles the Supreme Court’s case law on 
jurisdictional sequencing.  Such rules include the jurisdictional 
and quasi-jurisdictional questions that the Supreme Court has 
permitted lower courts to consider before addressing subject 
matter jurisdiction.219  Allocative rules also encompass 
discretionary doctrines,220 which, perhaps counterintuitively, also 
have the effect of limiting a federal court’s power.  When a court 
dismisses a case on the basis of forum non conveniens or comity, it 
chooses a course that, by definition, prevents it from adjudicating 
a conduct rule.  Such discretionary threshold issues thus fit 
comfortably within the realm of allocative rules because they 
allocate decision-making authority to another tribunal. 
In contrast with the present litigant theory, which admittedly 
can explain the outcome of the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional 
sequencing cases, allocative rules also can explain the assumptions 
underlying those cases.  Ruhrgas explicitly noted that a dismissal 
on a threshold ground could have wide-ranging preclusive 
                                                                                                                   
 218 Arguably such an approach could foster the greatest efficiency.  If a federal court can 
establish subject matter jurisdiction with relative ease, it has the incentive to do so in order 
to ensure that any dismissal will prevent inefficient relitigation of certain issues.  By 
contrast, if a question of subject matter jurisdiction is especially difficult, the more efficient 
solution might be dismissal on another ground, even if that dismissal does not have 
preclusive consequences. 
 219 See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 577–78 (personal jurisdiction); Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, 100–01 
n.3 (1998) (Younger abstention). 
 220 See Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323, 2336–37 (2010) (comity); 
Sinochem, 549 U.S. 722, 432–33 (2007) (forum non conveniens). 
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effects.221  That assumption is at odds with the present litigant 
theory, which is predicated on the idea that dismissals on 
threshold grounds should have narrow preclusive consequences 
and should not effectively prevent a case from being litigated in 
another forum.222  Approaching jurisdictional sequencing from the 
perspective of allocative rules, on the other hand, is fully 
consistent with the Court’s observations about the preclusive 
effects of threshold dismissals.  As discussed above, whether a 
court may dismiss a case on a particular ground is independent of 
what preclusive consequences, if any, should attach to such 
dismissals.  Because a focus on allocative rules keeps those 
concepts distinct, it better explains and reconciles the various 
elements of the Court’s jurisdictional sequencing cases. 
Finally, the theory developed here clears up confusion by some 
courts and scholars about the Supreme Court’s use of the term 
“nonmerits.”223  The concept of allocative rules captures the sense 
in which the Court consistently has regarded a “nonmerits” 
dismissal simply as the opposite of a “merits” dismissal (i.e., a 
dismissal based on a conduct rule).  Indeed, virtually any dismissal 
might implicate the underlying merits of a case.  For example, 
subject matter jurisdiction might turn on the amount in 
controversy; at the same time the question of an ultimate 
monetary remedy surely goes to the merits of a case.224  Similarly, 
a question of personal jurisdiction might turn on a defendant’s 
contacts with the forum state, and those contacts likewise could be 
relevant at the merits stage of litigation.  A threshold dismissal 
based on an allocative rule is a nonmerits dismissal not because it 
                                                                                                                   
 221 Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585–86. 
 222 See Clermont, supra note 6, at 329–30 (“[T]he list of resequenceable grounds should 
include only those defenses that could result in decisions not on the merits, in the claim-
preclusive sense.” (emphasis omitted)); cf. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585 (not indulging 
Clermont’s argument that different preclusion consequences should attend a court’s finding 
that jurisdiction exists and a finding that it does not exist). 
 223 See, e.g., Dominguez–Cota v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 396 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 
2005) (noting that “the question of the convenience of the forum is not completely separate 
from the merits of the action” (quoting Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527–28 
(1998) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Clermont, supra note 6, at 325–28 (noting 
confusion as to what counts as a nonmerits dismissal). 
 224 See supra notes 148–52 and accompanying text. 
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is completely divorced from a case’s underlying merits; rather, a 
nonmerits threshold issue genuinely seeks to resolve a preliminary 
question about the scope of a court’s authority rather than to 
adjudicate the underlying substance of the case.  Consequently, 
the distinction between conduct rules and allocative rules explains 
the Court’s case law and resolves the ambiguity as to what 
constitutes a “nonmerits” issue. 
By explaining the jurisprudence, the theory presented here can 
serve as a useful guide for lower courts that have struggled to 
apply the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional-sequencing cases.  Lower 
courts can rely on a predictive model that is faithful to the 
applicable precedents. 
D.  OPERATIONALIZING THE THEORY 
One of the central goals of this Article has been to provide a 
coherent theoretical grounding for jurisdictional sequencing and 
thereby help courts determine what qualifies as an appropriate 
threshold ground for dismissal.  In most cases, the theory 
presented here offers readily discernible answers. 
I cautioned earlier that an allocative rule is not necessarily the 
same thing as a procedural rule.  Despite the allure of linking 
allocative rules, for purposes of jurisdictional sequencing, with 
procedural rules, as developed by the Erie line of cases, the two 
doctrines should remain conceptually distinct for a number of 
reasons.  Most important, as Ely has noted, different sources of 
law govern Erie cases,225 meaning that a particular issue might be 
procedural in one context but substantive in another.  Allocative 
rules avoid distinctions based on the source of the rule and usually 
are easier to apply than the various Erie inquiries.  Whether a rule 
qualifies as an allocative rule turns on the single question of 
whether it seeks to allocate decision-making authority, 
                                                                                                                   
 225 Ely, supra note 183, at 697–700; see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 
U.S. 415, 427 & n.7 (1996) (noting that the substance–procedure distinction can be “a 
challenging endeavor” depending on the sources of law involved). 
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irrespective of any spillover effects on the merits of the underlying 
claim.226 
Distinguishing between a conduct rule and an allocative rule 
usually presents no arduous inquiry.  The most obvious examples 
of appropriate threshold grounds for dismissal are truly 
jurisdictional rules (including subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction) as well as quasi-jurisdictional rules (including most 
abstention doctrines), all of which seek to delimit the scope of a 
federal court’s ability to hear a case.  Discretionary dismissals, 
including under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, also are 
included.  Moreover, many of the issues that lower courts have 
regarded as appropriate threshold grounds for dismissal fall 
within the rubric of allocative rules, including venue, ripeness, and 
whether parties have fulfilled certain procedural requirements 
before they may seek particular forms of relief.227  And for the 
reasons discussed later in this Part, class certification questions, 
despite their overlap with the merits of a case, concern the 
threshold issue of whether a particular litigation device is 
available. 
The practical effect of this approach is to approve the more 
expansive interpretations of “threshold” issues that courts may 
decide at the outset of litigation.  It also suggests that issues such 
as mandatory party joinder228 and preclusion,229 which some courts 
have refused to decide ahead of subject matter jurisdiction, in fact 
qualify as allocative rules. 
There is, however, one important sense in which the theory 
developed here would restrict the leeway available under 
jurisdictional sequencing.  The First, Second, and D.C. Circuits, 
pursuant to the Article III theory, have assumed the ability to hold 
a question of statutory subject matter jurisdiction in abeyance and 
                                                                                                                   
 226 Cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1451–53 
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (expressing concern, in the Rules Enabling Act context, that 
procedural rules can affect substantive rights). 
 227 See supra notes 56–65 and accompanying text. 
 228 See Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2005) (deciding a jurisdictional 
question before a Rule 19 issue). 
 229 See Envtl. Conservation Org. v. City of Dallas, 529 F.3d 519, 525 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(deciding a mootness issue before a preclusion question). 
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reach any other issue, including merits questions (i.e., conduct 
rules).230  That approach no longer appears justified.  Instead, the 
source of a truly jurisdictional limitation is irrelevant, and a court 
may skip over such limitations only to adjudicate an allocative 
rule. 
Determining whether a rule is an allocative or conduct rule 
usually will not be difficult for the reasons discussed.  Although I 
do not claim to provide an answer for every conceivable issue that 
could arise, I offer some thoughts on how to assess a few of the 
more challenging issues at the margins of the theory presented 
here.  My conclusions regarding the following issues are tentative, 
precisely because they are among the most difficult questions. 
1.  Act of State Doctrine.  The act of state doctrine, a common 
law doctrine that prevents federal courts from judging the validity 
of certain actions by foreign sovereigns,231 presents a close call.  It 
applies only when (1) there has been an act of a foreign state, 
including a foreign “statute, decree, order, or resolution”; (2) a 
federal court necessarily would have to sit in judgment of that act’s 
validity; and (3) the act occurred within the foreign sovereign’s 
own territory.232  Bo Rutledge has observed that the act of state 
doctrine does not lend itself to easy classification as a merits or 
nonmerits ground for dismissal.233  He has argued persuasively, 
though, that the doctrine “seems difficult to distinguish from other 
non-merits defenses” that the Supreme Court has recognized.234 
Despite the D.C. Circuit’s general willingness to recognize a 
broad array of defenses as nonmerits threshold issues, the court 
has treated the act of state doctrine as a merits question.235  
Relying on Supreme Court precedent that has referred to the 
                                                                                                                   
 230 See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text. 
 231 See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990) 
(describing the act of state doctrine); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 
401 (1964) (same). 
 232 Rutledge, supra note 6, at 47 (quoting Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of 
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695 (1976)). 
 233 Id. at 48. 
 234 Id. at 49. 
 235 E.g., World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 1154, 1161 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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doctrine as a “rule of decision,”236 the D.C. Circuit classified it as a 
“substantive rule of law” that a court may not address in the 
absence of subject matter jurisdiction.237  Admittedly, the court has 
not revisited that classification since the Supreme Court’s 
Sinochem decision.238 
In one sense, the act of state doctrine might be akin to a 
conduct rule insofar as it creates a wider berth for foreign states to 
exercise their prerogatives.  Moreover, a court’s application of the 
act of state doctrine effectively leaves undisturbed the foreign 
sovereign’s actions.  For two reasons, though, the doctrine 
probably fits more comfortably alongside other allocative rules.  
First, it is a rule designed to “preclude judicial inquiry,” a factor 
that the D.C. Circuit has recognized as a touchstone of many 
allocative rules.239  Second, and arguably more significantly, the 
act of state doctrine expressly prevents a federal court from 
assessing the validity of certain actions by a foreign sovereign.240  
In other words, when federal courts decide that the doctrine 
applies, they do so precisely to avoid creating or altering a conduct 
rule.  In that sense, it essentially is a rule of abstention, which is 
how many courts and scholars have understood the act of state 
doctrine.241  From that perspective, it has the trappings of a 
quintessential allocative rule.  Despite the potential overlap 
between the act of state doctrine’s elements and issues that will 
arise again at the merits stage of litigation, the doctrine appears 
most readily classifiable as an allocative rule. 
                                                                                                                   
236 Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406 (quoting Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 
(1918)). 
 237 Papandreou, 139 F.3d at 256 (citing Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 408–10). 
 238 Rutledge, supra note 6, at 48. 
 239 Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 486 F.3d 1342, 1347–48 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(quoting Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (2005)). 
 240 Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 405–06. 
 241 E.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 
(9th Cir. 2006) (citing West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 827 (9th Cir. 
1987)); Bigio v. Coca–Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 444 (2d Cir. 2000).  Figuring out how to 
classify the act of state doctrine has been controversial, though.  See Michael J. Bazyler, 
Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 327–28 (1985) (describing the 
uncertain nature of the doctrine); see also Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406 (“The act of state 
doctrine is not some vague doctrine of abstention . . . .”). 
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2.  Immunity Doctrines.  Immunity questions raise particularly 
thorny problems, especially because immunity comes in various 
guises, including sovereign immunity,242 absolute immunity,243 and 
qualified immunity.244  In all instances, it is an affirmative defense 
that, at least under certain circumstances, the defendant is not 
amenable to suit, irrespective of whether the plaintiff has stated a 
valid cause of action.245 
The D.C. Circuit has held that “[s]overeign immunity questions 
clearly belong among the non-merits decisions that courts may 
address even where subject matter jurisdiction is uncertain.”246  
The court’s explanation was parsimonious,247 but its intuition 
captures an important way in which allocative rules work.248  It 
cited a Supreme Court decision that recognized that the defense is 
waivable.249  Precisely for that reason, sovereign immunity does 
not define or negate the plaintiff’s cause of action.  When a 
plaintiff sues a defendant who has the option of invoking the 
immunity defense, the underlying conduct rule, which defines 
rights and obligations, remains fully intact, regardless of whether 
a defendant has claimed or waived sovereign immunity.250  In that 
                                                                                                                   
 242 Sovereign immunity, in its various forms, generally prevents litigants from suing 
federal, state, and foreign governments without their consent. 
 243 Absolute immunity prevents an official from being sued for any official act, even if the 
official has made “grave” mistakes.  Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978).  
Absolute immunity usually applies to legislators, judges, prosecutors, and the President of 
the United States.  See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). 
 244 Qualified immunity generally prevents lower-level executive officials from being sued 
when they have acted in “good faith.”  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815–18. 
 245  See, e.g., Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 537 (2002) (state sovereign 
immunity); San Filippo v. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 470 U.S. 1035, 1035–36 (1985) (absolute 
immunity); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (qualified immunity). 
 246 Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 247 See id. (citing In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 
 248 Other courts have discussed whether certain forms of immunity are merits 
determinations for purposes of preclusion.  See, e.g., Bloomquist v. Brady, 894 F. Supp. 108, 
116 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (determining that a decision on sovereign immunity is preclusive).  
But as I have discussed above, see supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text, questions of 
jurisdictional sequencing and preclusion are, and should remain, conceptually distinct. 
 249 See Galvan, 199 F.3d at 463 (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994)). 
 250 See, e.g., The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 155 (1868) (noting that when a ship seized by 
the United States committed injury “the claim exists equally as if the vessel belonged to a 
private citizen” but that such a claim “against the government [is] incapable of enforcement 
without its consent”).  But see Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (“A 
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regard, such immunity is akin to personal jurisdiction, another 
allocative rule,251 to the extent that both rules define the 
circumstances under which a court may hale a particular 
defendant into court.  In both situations, the defendant may raise 
the defense or consent to proceeding with the lawsuit.  That is true 
despite the fact that the invocation of the defense will have a 
tremendous, and often dispositive, effect on the plaintiff’s ability to 
enforce a particular right. 
As I have noted before, a rule that affects enforcement of a right 
still qualifies as an allocative rule so long as it does not define the 
underlying right.  Therein lies the rub with sovereign immunity.  
On the one hand, from the sovereign’s perspective, the extent of its 
obligations almost certainly is colored by the knowledge that, 
under certain circumstances, it cannot be compelled to defend 
against a lawsuit.  That knowledge likely affects its primary 
conduct.252  On the other hand, the underlying right remains the 
same.  The elements of the cause of action are unchanged, and the 
plaintiff has the ability to enforce the right if the sovereign waives 
immunity.  The better view, from my perspective, is that the D.C. 
Circuit was correct; sovereign immunity rules are allocative rules 
precisely because they are not an element of the underlying cause 
of action and thus leave those conduct rules undisturbed. 
In contrast to sovereign immunity, qualified immunity looks 
much more like a conduct rule.  Qualified immunity protects 
lower-level executive officials when “their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”253  In assessing a qualified 
immunity defense, a court usually must answer two questions: 
first, whether a plaintiff has alleged or proved that the defendant 
                                                                                                                   
sovereign is exempt from suit . . . on the logical and practical ground that there can be no 
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.”). 
 251 See generally Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 1559 (2002) (discussing the waivability of sovereign immunity). 
 252 The question whether a particular rule affects someone’s primary conduct is a good but 
imperfect rule of thumb to identify a conduct rule.  Immunity doctrines might be an 
instance in which an allocative rule nonetheless shapes primary conduct. 
 253 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818 (1982)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
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violated a constitutional right; and, second, whether the right was 
clearly established at the time the violation occurred.254 
Those inquiries do not simply involve an overlap with the 
underlying merits of a lawsuit; they effectively are the merits.255  
Unlike in the sovereign immunity context, a judge assessing 
qualified immunity must determine the contours of a conduct rule 
(i.e., the asserted constitutional right), how to apply that conduct 
rule to the facts of the case, or sometimes both.  Although in one 
sense qualified immunity is a threshold issue that precedes trial 
and is subject to waiver, it functions as a mechanism for bringing 
forward the merits of a case and resolving them at an earlier stage 
of litigation,256 in some ways akin to dispositive motions under the 
Federal Rules.257  By calling for the resolution of merits questions, 
rather than matters ancillary to the merits, qualified immunity 
most likely is a conduct rule that courts may resolve only after 
confirming their subject matter jurisdiction. 
E.  BROADER SCHOLARLY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
The theory of jurisdictional sequencing presented here is part of 
a broader reconceptualization of jurisdiction.  Grounding 
jurisdictional sequencing in a structural view of subject matter 
jurisdiction is consistent with scholarly trends that have identified 
a disconnection between the language and reality of jurisdiction.  
My approach advances the discussion and proposes a systematic 
                                                                                                                   
 254 See id. at 232 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).  Pearson held that 
“while the sequence set forth [in Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no longer be 
regarded as mandatory.”  Id. at 236. 
 255 When a court decides that a right is not clearly established, but does not determine 
whether a defendant actually violated a plaintiff’s rights, some scholars have suggested that 
the court has not reached the case’s merits.  E.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order 
of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 115–17; Nancy Leong, Making 
Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 433 (2012).  As I use the term “merits,” though, a court that 
decides whether a right is clearly established has indeed decided a merits question (i.e., 
whether a particular conduct rule clearly exists), albeit without applying that rule to the 
facts of the case. 
 256 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231–32 (noting that qualified immunity is not merely a 
defense to liability and serves to weed out insubstantial claims). 
 257 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss); FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (motion for 
summary judgment). 
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way to understand the apparent malleability of jurisdiction, 
particularly when courts confront other threshold issues, including 
vexing class certification questions. 
Over the last generation, scholars have begun to explore the 
idea that while courts usually speak of crisp lines that demarcate 
jurisdictional questions, courts actually treat jurisdiction as a 
much more supple concept.258  Other scholars have noted, with 
varying degrees of approval, the extent to which jurisdiction and 
merits questions can and do become intertwined.259  Fred Bloom, 
for example, has called jurisdiction’s self-proclaimed rigidity a 
“noble lie” that often gives way to practical concerns at the 
margins.260  On the other hand, Laura Fitzgerald has cautioned 
against jurisdictional rules that are born of a court’s unvarnished 
desire to reach particular questions on the merits.261  Regardless of 
whether they view the intertwining as unprincipled or a useful 
exercise in pragmatism, scholars generally have treated the 
entanglement of jurisdictional and merits questions as something 
that happens in the shadows, without full candor. 
The approach that I have proffered draws on much of the 
sophisticated work in this field and suggests a systematic way to 
understand some facets of jurisdictional malleability.  Scott 
Dodson, for example, has argued that rules can be “hybridized”—
that lawmakers can graft certain nonjurisdictional features (such 
as waiver and forfeiture) onto jurisdictional rules and vice versa.262  
                                                                                                                   
 258 See, e.g., Ann Althouse, The Humble and the Treasonous: Judge-Made Jurisdiction 
Law, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1035, 1047–48 (1990) (arguing that Congress may override 
any judicially created jurisdictional doctrine); Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The 
Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1990) 
(positing a “dialogic approach” to jurisdiction in which “the contours of federal jurisdiction 
are resolved as the result of an interactive process between Congress and the Court”). 
 259 See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 97, at 1002–03; Scott Dodson, The Complexity of 
Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2011) (noting the difficulty of determining 
whether certain statutory limitations are jurisdictional); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is 
Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1217–20 (2001) (discussing how a 
concern about remedies can influence jurisdictional determinations); Lee, supra note 201, at 
1615–27 (arguing that jurisdiction is not conceptually distinct from merits questions). 
 260 See Bloom, supra note 97, at 1021–23. 
 261 See Fitzgerald, supra note 259, at 1273–78. 
 262 Dodson, supra note 3, at 1457–61; Dodson, supra note 52, at 9; see also Wasserman, 
supra note 201 (exploring ways to understand and systematize boundaries between 
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The dichotomy between conduct rules and allocative rules 
contributes to an understanding of why jurisdiction should apply 
more or less rigidly.  These projects endeavor not only to explain 
jurisdictional malleability but, more importantly, to elucidate the 
circumstances under which flexibility is (and is not) justified. 
Moreover, the vision of subject matter jurisdiction that I have 
developed has applications beyond jurisdictional sequencing and 
resonates with other doctrinal developments that resist a 
reductionist view of subject matter jurisdiction.  The most obvious 
development is the Supreme Court’s effort in recent years to clean 
up its use of the term “jurisdictional.”  As the Court in Steel Co. 
observed, jurisdiction “is a word of many, too many, meanings.”263  
In Kontrick v. Ryan, the Court acknowledged that it and other 
courts had “been less than meticulous” in using the word 
“jurisdictional.”264  Too often, the Court said, various rules had 
been called jurisdictional when in fact they were actually 
nonjurisdictional “claim-processing rule[s].”265  The Supreme Court 
thus has shown greater candor as it has grappled with whether a 
particular rule is truly “jurisdictional” and what exactly that 
means.266  Even more revealingly, for purposes of this Article, the 
Court has wrestled openly with the sometimes elusive distinction 
between jurisdictional and merits questions.  For example, in 
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., the Court, again noting its sometimes 
“profligate” use of the term “jurisdictional,”267 had to determine 
whether certain questions pertained to a federal court’s 
jurisdiction or simply to the elements of a cause of action.268 
Perhaps the most instructive parallels to the jurisdictional-
sequencing cases, though, are recent developments regarding the 
                                                                                                                   
jurisdiction, merits, and procedure). 
 263 Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (quoting United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 
n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 264 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004). 
 265 Id. at 456. 
 266 See id. (noting that a nonjurisdictional objection can be forfeited); Eberhart v. United 
States, 546 U.S. 12, 18 (2005) (same); see also Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212–13 
(2007) (noting that Congress controls whether a statutory restriction is jurisdictional). 
 267 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006). 
 268 See id. 510–11 (resolving “the proper classification of Title VII’s statutory limitation of 
covered employers to those with 15 or more employees”). 
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certification of class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23.  Questions of class certification most directly challenge the 
coherence of a firm division between jurisdictional, threshold, and 
merits questions.  In some ways class certification represents the 
most knotty threshold question that almost invariably touches 
upon a case’s underlying merits.  Every class action under Rule 23 
has to satisfy the requirements of numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, and adequacy of representation.269  Determining 
whether plaintiffs’ claims raise common questions of law or fact 
and whether the class representatives’ claims are typical of other 
claims in the class often requires a searching examination of the 
case’s underlying merits. 
Richard Nagareda has described a “distinctive law of class 
certification.”270  Most courts of appeals now insist that a “court 
must affirmatively determine whether the relevant requirements 
for class certification under Rule 23 have been met . . . , even when 
the dispute over certification—for example, by way of competing 
expert reports—overlaps with the parties’ ultimate dispute on the 
merits.”271  Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that a 
“rigorous analysis” of Rule 23’s requirements “will entail some 
overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.  That 
cannot be helped.”272 
The assessment of a threshold question that is inextricably 
connected to the merits of a case often happens, sometimes of 
necessity, before a court has established its subject matter 
jurisdiction.  In Amchem, a case that predated the jurisdictional-
sequencing trilogy, the Supreme Court skipped over the question 
of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the “class certification 
issues [were] dispositive” and “logically antecedent to the existence 
of any Article III issues.”273  Although courts of appeals have 
                                                                                                                   
 269 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 270 Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again? Pretrial as Trial in Complex Litigation, 60 
DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 664 (2011). 
 271 Id. at 665 (footnote omitted). 
 272 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 273 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612 (1997) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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disagreed about the extent to which Amchem permits courts to 
pretermit a jurisdictional question and decide a class certification 
issue,274 courts clearly recognize that at least sometimes they may 
hold subject matter jurisdiction in abeyance and decide a threshold 
question that nearly always taps into a case’s underlying merits.275 
The class certification context offers the most vivid illustration 
of the nuanced interplay between jurisdiction, threshold questions, 
and the merits.  As the Supreme Court and lower courts wrestle 
with those questions, the theory of jurisdictional sequencing 
advanced here offers a way forward.  What Nagareda described as 
the “distinctive law of class certification” might not be so 
distinctive after all.  As I have demonstrated, the supposedly pat 
division of jurisdictional versus merits questions breaks down in a 
number of contexts and requires a sophisticated understanding of 
how those issues interact as well as how courts should navigate 
uncertain waters. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have argued that the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdictional-sequencing cases are not a make-shift doctrine that 
flouts the strictures of subject matter jurisdiction.  Instead, 
jurisdictional sequencing is consistent with the more nuanced 
vision of subject matter jurisdiction that I have developed here.  
According to that vision, subject matter jurisdiction functions as a 
narrow structural constraint, rather than a personal privilege, 
that protects the power of Congress and state governments to craft 
conduct rules that regulate primary activity.  Subject matter 
jurisdiction is essential only when federal courts adjudicate, and at 
                                                                                                                   
 274 See supra note 69. 
 275  The class certification context also reveals tensions that I have discussed above, in 
particular what preclusive effect should attend a threshold dismissal that necessarily has 
touched upon merits questions.  See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 
305, 318 (3d Cir. 2008) (expressly permitting an assessment of merits questions for 
purposes of class certification and noting that “[a]lthough the district court’s findings for the 
purpose of class certification are conclusive on that topic, they do not bind the fact-finder on 
the merits”); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he 
determination as to a Rule 23 requirement is made only for purposes of class certification 
and is not binding on the trier of facts, even if that trier is the class certification judge.”). 
1160 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 47:1099 
 
 
the margins create, conduct rules.  By contrast, courts do not 
necessarily have to verify jurisdiction before they expound upon 
allocative rules that govern procedure and judicial administration. 
The distinction between conduct rules and allocative rules is 
the only theory that fully explains the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdictional-sequencing cases.  Consequently, it offers the 
promise of greater predictability when lower courts confront 
sequencing questions.  More importantly, the theory advanced 
here helps make sense of the interplay between merits, 
jurisdictional, and other threshold issues.  The reimagining of 
subject matter jurisdiction thus contributes to an ongoing dialogue 
about jurisdiction’s malleability and offers a framework for 
understanding why jurisdiction often is more flexible than its rigid 
rhetoric suggests. 
 
 
